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1. Dante Alighieri, Paradiso, vol. 3 of La divina commedia, ed. Natalino Sapegno (Florence,
1985), bk. 14, 11. 13–18, p. 185; hereafter abbreviated P. According to Thomas Aquinas, the
resurrected body will shine more brightly than the sun, which burns the eye. Yet, because its
light will emanate from the soul, it will only give pleasure to the blessed. See Thomas Aquinas,
Summa theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols. (Westminster,
Mar., 1981), suppl. QQ. 85, art. 2, 5:2914. For Dante, virtually the entire experience of paradise is
a confrontationwith unbearable light—“battaglia de’ debili cigli” (P, bk. 23, l. 78, p. 294). The
poet even suﬀers temporary blindness when he tries to see through the light that emanates from
Saint John’s soul in order to see the saint’s body, which according to legend had ascended
directly to Paradise; see P, bk. 25, pp. 314–25.
Brains, Bodies, Selves, and Science:
Anthropologies of Identity and the
Resurrection of the Body
Fernando Vidal
A Desire for Dead Bodies
Before Dante leaves the fourth heaven, that of the sun, inhabited by the
souls of the wise, Beatrice formulates for him what he desires to know yet
would say neither with his voice nor with his thought. Will the light with
which the disembodied souls blossom remain with them eternally and, if
so, will it not harm their sense of sight after they regain their bodies?1 Solo-
mon’s answer—a “modest voice” coming forth from a “most divine light”—
is that, as burning coal outshines ﬁre, resurrected bodies will outshine
disembodied souls; but their light will cause them no fatigue because their
organs “will be strong for everything that can bring them delight” (P, bk.
14, ll. 43–46, p. 187). At resurrection, our person will be all the more perfect
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2. Beatitude, or beatiﬁc vision, is the reward of the blessed and the ultimate end of the human
being. It is the operationwhereby the intellectual soul “sees” the divine essence; by means of such
visio Dei, the intellect reaches the essence of its own ﬁrst cause, thus becoming perfect through
union with God; see Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a–2ae, Q. 1–3, 2:583–602. “For now we see
through a glass, darkly; but then face to face” (1 Cor. 13:12).
3. See Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a–2ae, Q. 4, art. 1–2, 2:604.
4. On this question, especially in Bonaventure and Peter Lombard, see CarolineWalker Bynum,
The Resurrection of the Body inWestern Christianity, 200–1336 (New York, 1995), pp. 247–55.
5. See Saint Augustine,De Genesi ad litteram [The Literal Meaning of Genesis], trans. John
Hammond Taylor, vols. 41–42 ofAncient ChristianWriters: TheWorks of the Fathers in Translation,
ed. Johannes Quasten,Walter J. Burghardt, and Thomas Comerford Lawler (New York, 1982),
vol. 2, bk. 12, chap. 35, § 68, pp. 228–29.
6. Bernard de Clairvaux, Liber de diligendoDeo, trans. Franc¸oise Callerot et al., under the title
L’Amour de Dieu, vol. 29 ofOeuvres comple`tes (Paris, 1993), 11.30, pp. 136, 137.
as the soul and the body are reunited. The resurrected, “glorious” body of
the blessed will be adapted to the state of beatitude, apt to rejoice in the
“beatiﬁc vision.”2 Delight or pleasure, explains Aquinas, is not required for
beatitude. Nevertheless, in the sameway that the grace of youth results from
youth itself, pleasure is a concomitant of the beatiﬁc vision.3 The glorious
body will be prepared for it.
As they hear Solomon describe their future embodied state, the choruses
of souls cry out “Amen!”—“Thus be it!” Dante sees therein an expression
of the souls’ “desire for dead bodies” (P, bk. 14, l. 63, p. 188). A disembodied
soul, Solomon implies, is not a person. And, yet, is there not a contradiction
in the assertion that bliss as visio Dei necessitates the ﬂesh, that perfection
for eternity requires a corporeal existence? Early Christian theologians did
not fail to see the problem their religion had set forth.4
Saint Augustine asserted that the human intellectual soul cannot see
God’s substance the way angels do and speculated that such inferiority re-
sults from the soul’s “natural appetite” to govern the body. Desiderium or
inclinatio ad corpus prevents the soul from fully aspiring towardGodas long
as it is not in control of the body.5 Is, then, a body necessary for the beatiﬁc
vision, and what diﬀerence would it make? Following Augustine, Bernard
of Clairvaux insisted that there is no perfect beatitude before resurrection;
after death, souls remain “linked to the body”—not by animal life or sen-
sation, but by a sort of natural attachment—to the point of neither willing
nor being able to realize themselves without the body.6Aquinas, on thecon-
trary, maintained that disembodied souls can enjoy the beatiﬁc vision and
that such vision is as intense (that is, qualitatively the same) before as after
the resurrection of the ﬂesh. Yet, insofar as the soul desires its body, be-
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7. See Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a–2ae, Q. 4, art. 6, 2:606–7.
8. “So prompt and eager seemed to me one chorus and the other to say ‘Amen!’ that well they
showed desire for dead bodies—maybe not for themselves, but for the mamas, the fathers and the
others dear to them before becoming imperishable ﬂames” (P, bk. 14, ll. 61–66, p. 188).
9. See Vittore Sermonti, Il Paradiso di Dante, ed. Cesare Segre (Milano, 1993), p. 231.
10. Augustine,De Genesi ad litteram, bk. 8, chap. 25, § 47, p. 66.
11. See Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a–2ae, Q. 4, art. 8, 2:608.
12. Dante,De vulgari eloquentia, trans. and ed. Steven Botterill (Cambridge, 1996), bk. 2,
chap. 7, pp. 66, 68, 69. Pexus, said primarily of “neatly combed” hair, also qualiﬁes a well-groomed
person or a softly and densely hairy, silky, or wooly garment; its opposite is hirsutus, shaggy, rough,
coarse, unkempt.
atitude is extended (that is, quantitatively) after the reunion of soul and
body.7 Its plenitude, then, still requires the body, which is why the disem-
bodied souls of Dante’s Paradise desire their dead bodies in the ﬁrst place.
Dante, however, suggests that souls’ desire for embodiment concerns less
their own carnal existences than those of their mothers and their beloveds:
Tanto mi parver subiti e accorti
e l’uno e l’altro coro a dicer “Amme!”
che ben mostrar disio d’i corpi morti;
forse non pur per lor, ma per le mamme,
per li padri e per li altri che fuor cari
anzi que fosser sempiterne ﬁamme.8
Far from being, as has been said, the most childish, light, and tender hy-
pothesis of the entireDivine Comedy, thewords “maybe not for themselves”
( forse non pur per lor) point to speciﬁcally theologicalquestionsDanteknew
well.9 The whole of humankind will resurrect, but, it was asked, are the
others necessary for each person’s beatitude? Augustine declared that, in
order to be wise and happy, the only assistance a spiritual and intellectual
creature needs is the inner help conveyed by the Creator’s eternity, truth,
and charity; nevertheless, such creatures will perhaps see each other and
rejoice together “joined in one society with God.”10 For Aquinas, a societas
amicorum might contribute to the accomplishment of beatitude; none-
theless, the essential glory of the beatiﬁc vision resides in God, not in hu-
manity.11
Theological matters do not exhaust Dante’s rendering of the souls’ “de-
sire for dead bodies.” The distinction of “mamas” and “fathers” and their
proximity to “desire” result from a deliberate choice. In De vulgari elo-
quentia, the poet had classedmamma among the puerilia (childishwords),
characterized by their “simplicity,” and disio among the pexa, trisyllables
that convey a sense of suavitas, sweetness and pleasure.12 The contrast be-
tween mamme and padri is somewhat diminished by the enveloping tonal
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13. Beyond requirements of plot, style, and ﬁgurability, the ﬁction of body-shaped souls in
Inferno and Purgatorio is a way of asserting the ontological necessity of body. See Bynum, “Faith
Imagining the Self: Somatomorphic Soul and Resurrection Body in Dante’sDivine Comedy,” in
Faithful Imagining: Essays in Honor of Richard R. Niebuhr, ed. Sang Hyun Lee,Wayne Proudfoot,
and Albert Blackwell (Atlanta, 1995), pp. 81–104.
14. Margaret R. Miles,Carnal Knowing: Female Nakedness and ReligiousMeaning in the
ChristianWest (Boston, 1989), p. 185.
15. See Bynum, Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of the HighMiddle Ages (Berkeley,
1982), esp. chap. 4.
16. In Heaven, he wrote, God will be united to our intellect without the intermediary of
representation; we shall be
comme des enfants tre`s heureux . . . nourris de la propre substance divine, rec¸ue en notre aˆme
par la bouche de l’entendement; et ce qui surpasse toute douceur, c’est que, comme les me`res
ne se contentent pas de nourrir leurs poupons de leur lait . . . si elles-meˆmes ne mettent le
chicheron de leur te´tin dans leur bouche . . . en sorte que cette substancematernelle serve de
tuyau aussi bien que de nourriture . . . ainsi Dieu, notre Pe`re, ne se contente pas de faire
recevoir sa propre substance en notre entendement . . . mais par un abıˆme de sa douceur il
appliquera lui-meˆme sa substance a` notre esprit.
[Saint Franc¸ois de Sales, Traite´ de l’amour de Dieu (1616),Oeuvres, ed. Andre´ Ravier and Roger
Devos (Paris, 1969), bk. 3, chap. 11, pp. 513–14]
17. Sigmund Freud, “Thoughts for the Times onWar and Death” (1915),The Standard Edition
of the Complete PsychologicalWorks of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, 24 vols.
(London, 1953–74), 14:273–302; see esp. chap. 2.
18. See Freud,The Future of an Illusion, trans. and ed. Strachey (New York, 1975), see esp.
chap. 4.
quality of disio but reinforced by a hierarchy of objects of love: moms, fa-
thers, and the rest of the beloved. In the fourteenthbookofParadiso,waiting
for the resurrection entails longing for body, above all themother’s. Bodies,
therefore, are not mere adjuncts to the visio Dei but instruments of another
vision, that of the persons the blessed loved before death reduced them all
to disembodied souls.13 Restored ﬂesh gives beatitude its fullness, especially
as it allows communionwith themother. Itmaywell be that inChristianity,
“the body scorned . . . is a female body.”14 But it is no less true that mystics
ecstatically experienced Christ as a lactating mother15 and that, three cen-
turies after Dante, Franc¸ois de Sales extended earlier visions ofGod’smoth-
erhood to beatitude by describing it, in intensely carnal language, as feeding
at the mother’s breast.16
This would be fertile ground for psychoanalysis. According to Freud,we
are unconsciously convinced of our immortality, and beliefs about the af-
terlife are a compromise that allows us to accept death by denying its power
of annihilation.17 The structure of such compromise is dictated by the new-
born’s state of absolute dependence. Like other religious representations,
the afterlife is shaped by memories of childhood and the human species, as
a way of enduring our original helplessness.18 Had Freud interpreted book
fourteen of Paradise, he would have related Dante’s mamme to his notion
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19. Ibid., p. 38.
20. Pierre-Jean-GeorgeCabanis, “Lettre a` M. F. sur les causes premie`res” (ca. 1806–07),Oeuvres
philosophiques de Cabanis, ed. Claude Lehec and Jean Cazeneuve, 2 vols. (Paris, 1956), 2:267.
21. Vergil,Vergil’s “Aeneid” and Fourth (“Messianic”) Eclogue in the Dryden Translation, ed.
Howard Clarke (University Park, Penn., 1989), bk. 6, 1. 715, p. 169.
22. JohnMilton, Paradise Lost, ed. John Leonard (London, 2000), bk. 2, 11. 583–86, p. 39.
of themother as the child’s ﬁrst object of love and protector against anxiety.
Fond as he was of reading his theories into past authors, he would have
praised the poet’s psychological penetration. But he would have undoubt-
edly stuck to his conviction that religious notions are only “illusions, ful-
ﬁlments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of humanity.”19
Frustrated on earth, we invent the afterlife as the spatial and temporal
framework where our desires can be ﬁnally realized.
In a Freudian perspective, these lines from Paradisemove us because we
unconsciously recognize our deceptive defense against reality and our
mothers’ initial protective role.More positively, as a late eighteenth-century
materialist philosopher-physician put it, the desire and hope of a future life
derive not only from narrowly personal expectations but also from “the
noblest feelings of the human heart”—to be again with our loved ones and
to witness the full realization of justice and virtue.20 In either case, why not?
I suspect few of us are like Thomas More’s utopians who, convinced that
theywould be inﬁnitely happy in the afterlife, neither lamentnor feardeath.
Most of us sometimes do both; and considerable numbers are also con-
cerned about the hereafter. Beyond eschatology and anxiety, however, the
central problem of the Christian discourse about the resurrection is per-
sonal identity and particularly the relationship between self and body.
In theDivine Comedy, to be a person requires the unionof soul andbody.
Personhood is not exclusively psychological; as highlighted by the adjective
dead in corpi morti, a soul does not desire simply to have a body but to
recover the one to which it had been joined. Body and desire are at the heart
of personal identity and together tend toward the accomplishment of hu-
man perfection. Both, moreover, call for other presences. Each person’s
completeness necessitates love, especially the kind whose model is, for
Freud, the child’s relationship to the mother. In the Platonic view, souls,
before reincarnation, drink from the river of forgetfulness: “In Lethe’s lake
they long oblivion taste.”21 Immediately, they surrender their past lives and
identities:
Lethe the River of Oblivion rolls
Her wat’ry Labyrinth, whereof who drinks,
Forthwith his former state and being forgets,
Forgets both joy and grief, pleasure and pain.22
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23. See Frank Bottomley,Attitudes to the Body inWestern Christendom (London, 1979), esp.
pp. 157–60 and the overview of conciliar documents, pp. 233–34 n. 8.
24. Peter Brown,The Body and Society: Men,Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Earlier
Christianity (New York, 1988), p. 301.
25. Ibid., p. 298.
26. This is not to deny that there were indeed harsh condemnations of the ﬂesh, as well as
practices that can be interpreted in terms of repression (as, for example, Jacques Sole´ does
consistently in L’Amour en Occident a` l’e´poquemoderne; see Jacques Sole´, L’Amour en Occident a`
l’e´poque moderne [Paris, 1976], esp. pp. 85–150); yet, as highlighted inMichel Foucault’s La Volonte´
de savoir, the “repressive hypothesis” is vastly insuﬃcient. See Michel Foucault, La Volonte´ de
savoir, vol. 1 ofHistoire de la sexualite´ (Paris, 1976).
27. I have followed Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: TheMaking of theModern Identity
(Cambridge,Mass., 1989) for the characterizationof “modern identity.”
The Christian requirements for an afterlife are just the opposite ofmetem-
psychosis. Souls are not persons; life after death necessitates the original
body; and death is not the joyful liberation of soul from a prison of ﬂesh
but the disruption of the original unity of the human being.
This is consistent with Christian attitudes to the body. Although there
was no celebration of the body per se at the expense of the soul, redemption
included both, and the Church consistently condemned the decrying of
matter and the denigration of the humanbody.23Ascetic practiceswere seen
as ways to prepare the body to receive the spirit of God. Even a writer in
the Platonic tradition, such as Gregory of Nyssa in the fourth century, “was
concerned less with the heaviness of the body than with the tight knot of
anxieties that had gathered within the soul itself. . . . The true ‘plunge’ that
accounted for the misery of the human condition was not that of the soul
into the body; it was the plunge of the human person, body and soul to-
gether, into the present, fallen state of society.”24 For him, the goal of the
virgin life was not the repression of the sexual drive but “the withering
away in the human heart of the sense of time placed there by the fear of
death.”25 In general, a supposedly repressive andﬂesh-hatingpracticesuch
as permanent sexual renunciationwas away of living the body as a “temple
of the Holy Spirit” (1 Cor. 6:19) and preparing it to be like the body of the
risen Christ.26
Personal Identity and the History of the Body
My goal is not to comment on Dante or examine the theology of res-
urrection. Rather, I wish to explore how discussions on the resurrection of
the bodymay function as a ﬁl conducteur for a history of notions of personal
identity. As is clear from historical and anthropological studies, “modern
identity”—characterized by radical reﬂexivity, a sense of inwardness, aﬁrst-
person standpoint, and disengagement from body andworld—wouldhave
been incomprehensible for people in the past or other cultures.27We“have”
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28. See for exampleThe Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, ed. Michael
Carrithers, Steven Collins, and Steven Lukes (Cambridge, 1985); see also, as well as Taylor, Sources
of the Self, esp. part 2.
29. “Ieme considereraymoy-mesme comme n’ayant point de mains, point d’yeux, point de
chair, point de sang, comme n’ayant aucuns sens, mais croyant faussement auoir toutes ces
choses” (Rene´ Descartes, premie`reme´ditation,Me´ditations sur la philosophie premie`re [1641],
Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Ernest Adam and Paul Tannery [1896–1909; Paris, 1982], 9.1:18).
30. See Roy Porter, “History of the Body,” inNew Perspectives on HistoricalWriting, ed. Peter
Burke (University Park, Penn., 1991), p. 212; see also Porter, “Bodies of Thought: Thoughts about
the Body in Eighteenth-Century England,” in Interpretation and Cultural History, ed. JoanH.
Pittock and AndrewWear (New York, 1991), pp. 82–108.
bodies only in the perspective of the post-Lockean possessive individualism
thatmakes us their owners; objectiﬁed and distanced fromour “selves,”our
bodies are for us things we own, not entities we are. This observation, how-
ever, should not prevent us from talking, without anachronism, about self,
identity, individual, or person and to try to understand the sources of the
modern identity and what other peoples, past or present, consider essential
in order to ask and investigate the question, Who am I?28
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the terms of resurrec-
tion debates were altered and, at the intersection of philosophy, theology,
the life sciences, and psychology, participated in the emergence of newways
of thinking about the relation between persons and bodies. The study of
these transformations helps trace the emergence of the presently dominant
cognitivist, brain-based idea of personal identity and thus supports both a
critique of the self-as-brain philosophy and a formulation of more phe-
nomenological and experiential apprehensions of what it is to be human.
Problematic as it was and remains, the doctrine of bodily resurrection
contradicts the dualistic understanding of the history of body and the self
in the Christian West. Christianity is supposed to see the individual as a
duality, torn between an immortal soul to be elevated and redeemed and a
perishable body to be mortiﬁed and despised. Nevertheless, from an an-
thropological point of view, it holds the opposite of Descartes’s ﬁction of a
bodyless self.29 The idea that, for the Christian tradition, “being human
meant being an embodied mind” is inaccurate.30 The common expression
“embodied self ” involves the idea of a (potentially)disembodiedself.Chris-
tianity, however, rejects the possibility of a person existing otherwise than
as a composite of body and soul. As Ludwig Feuerbach angrily remarked in
1846,
Seligkeit ist das letzte Wort der Religion und Theologie. Aber was ist
Seligkeit? Sinnlichkeit als Objekt der Phantasie und des Gemu¨ts. Die
Behauptung, daß das Christentum nur eine geistige Seligkeit wolle, is
eine schamlose Lu¨ge der modernen Heuchler oder Ignoranten. Das
This content downloaded from 158.109.210.195 on March 02, 2016 04:50:12 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Critical Inquiry / Summer 2002 937
31. “Beatitude is the last word of religion and theology. But what is beatitude? Sensibility as the
object of phantasy and feelings. The assertion that Christianitywants only a spiritual beatitude is a
shameless lie of modern hypocrites or ignoramuses. Christianity diﬀerentiates itself from
philosophical paganism . . . precisely in that it formulates a carnal, i.e. a sensible beatitude and
immortality as ultimate end and essence of humanity” (Ludwig Feuerbach, “Wider den
Dualismus von Leib und Seele, Fleisch und Geist” [1846],GesammelteWerke, ed.Werner
Schuﬀenhauer [Berlin, 1989], 10:147). The whole text is a forceful manifesto against propositions
such as “Ich unterscheidemich vonmeinem Leibe” (p. 140), against the notion that “we” can
diﬀerentiate ourselves from our body or our brain otherwise than by a logical or “imaginary”
operation.
32. Antoine Vergote, “The Body as Understood in Contemporary Thought and Biblical
Categories” (1979), trans.MarkMuldoon, Philosophy Today 35 (1991): 96, 97. See also GedaliahuG.
Stroumsa, “Caro salutis cardo: Shaping the Person in Early Christian Thought,”History of
Religions 30 (1990): 25–50. For recent discussions of these issues: James F. Keenan, “Christian
Perspectives on the Human Body,”Theological Studies 55 (June 1994): 330–46, and Bynum, “Why
All the Fuss about the Body? AMedievalist’s Perspective,”Critical Inquiry 22 (Autumn 1995): 1–33.
33. See for example Fragments for a History of the Human Body, ed. Michel Feher, Ramona
Naddaﬀ, and Nadia Tazi, 3 vols. (New York, 1989); ArthurW. Frank, “For a Sociology of the Body:
An Analytical Review,” in The Body: Social Process and Cultural Theory, ed. Mike Featherstone,
Mike Hepworth, and Bryan S. Turner (London, 1991); andMargaret Lock, “Cultivating the Body:
Anthropology and Epistemologies of Bodily Practice and Knowledge,”Annual Review of
Anthropology 22 (1993): 133–55. On the neural, immunological, genetic, and phenotypic bodies and
their politico-scientiﬁc contexts, see Scott F. Gilbert, “Resurrecting the Body: Has Postmodernism
Had Any Eﬀect on Biology?” Science in Context 8 (Winter 1995): 563–77. For useful samples of
approaches and themes, seeGepeinigt, begehrt, vergessen: Symbolik und Sozialbezug des Ko¨rpers im
spa¨tenMittelalter und in der fru¨hen Neuzeit, ed. Klaus Schreiner and Norbert Schnitzler (Munich,
1992);Disciplina dell’anima, disciplina del corpo e disciplina della societa` tra medioevo ed eta`
moderna, ed. Paolo Prodi (Bologna, 1994). For recent studies about the “embodiment of
knowledge,” see Science Incarnate:Historical Embodiments of Natural Knowledge, ed. Christopher
Lawrence and Steven Shapin (Chicago, 1998). For a valuable discussion of conceptual and
methodological tensions within body history today, see Philipp Sarasin, “Mapping the Body:
Ko¨rpergeschichte zwischen Konstruktivismus, Politik und ‘Ehrfahrung,’”Historische
Anthropologie 7, no. 3 (1999): 437–51.
34. See, for a synthetic presentation,HaroldW. Noonan, Personal Identity (London, 1989); for a
useful anthology, see Personal Identity, ed. John Perry (Berkeley, 1975). See also Stephane Ferret, Le
Christentum unterschied sich gerade dadurch von dem philoso-
phischen Heidentume . . . daß es eine ﬂeischliche, d. i. sinnliche, Selig-
keit und Unsterblichkeit als letztes Ziel und Wesen des Menschen
aussprach.31
In the calmer words of a contemporary theologian, a person “is not some-
one who has a body but whose existence is corporeal”; as suggested by the
doctrine of the resurrection of the ﬂesh, “the body is the whole man.”32
Today, from artistic avant-gardes to popular self-help and personal de-
velopment manuals, the body is omnipresent. The human sciences ponder
the construction of bodies and the practices and discourses that govern
them; body history is a blooming ﬁeld.33 In contrast, the academic philos-
ophy of personal identity often reduces, if only by way of a speculative ex-
ercise, the body to the brain.34Most puzzle cases used to thinkabout identity
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Philosophe et son scalpel: Le Proble`me de l’identite´ personnelle (Paris, 1993), which emphasizes the
place of the brain.
35. Such an operation, of course, is not (yet?) feasible, but some individuals already protect
themselves against it. The text of an older version of the Swisstransplant cards carried by potential
organ donors explicitly excluded the brain and the organs of reproduction. Individual identity was
thus doubly preserved for both the donors and for those persons whose identity would be partly
deﬁned by the fact of being their descendants.
36. ThomasNagel,The View fromNowhere (New York, 1986), p. 40. Nagel describes this
hypothesis of the brain’s indispensability as a “mild exaggeration.”
37. See RobertM. Veatch, “The Impending Collapse of theWhole-BrainDeﬁnition of Death,”
Hastings Center Report 23 (July-Aug. 1993): 18–24. See alsoDeath: BeyondWhole-Brain Criteria,
ed. RichardM. Zaner (Dordrecht, 1988); Ronald E. Cranford and David Randolph Smith,
“Consciousness: TheMost CriticalMoral (Constitutional) Standard for Human Personhood,”
American Journal of Law andMedicine 13, no. 2–3 (1987): 233–48; and the critique byMarioMoussa
and Thomas A. Shannon, “The Search for the New Pineal Gland: Brain Life and Personhood,”
Hastings Center Report 22 (May-June 1992): 30–37.
38. Hans-Martin Sass, “Brain Life and Brain Death: A Proposal for a Normative Agreement,”
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (1989): 45–59.
imply that only the brain is truly indispensable, and that seems validated
by the cognitive neurosciences. If the brain of person A is transplanted into
the body of person B, then A undergoes a body transplant, rather than B a
brain transplant.35 This is a simple situation compared to the cases of ﬁssion
in which each hemisphere is transplanted into a diﬀerent body. Apparently,
we can do without the rest of the body; in fact, “I am my brain.”36 In spite
of its apparent abstraction, the neurophilosophical reductionof self touches
upon momentous medical and bioethical debates about the beginning and
the end of life.
As a consequence of the development of resuscitation techniques in the
1960s, the total cessation of heart and respiratory functions became insuf-
ﬁcient as a criterion of death. Those functions could be artiﬁcially pro-
longed after the destruction of the relevant portions of the brain or revived
in cases of limited damage. Thus evolved the deﬁnition of brain death. But
which are the functions or regions of the brain whose destruction entails
death? In theory, death implies the deﬁnitive cessation of the functions of
the whole brain. In practice, however, the patient’s personality, memory,
judgment, reasoning, and capacities for conscious feeling and thinking are
recognized as the functions whose end signals the death of a humanperson.
Since the mid-1970s, under the name of cortical or cognitive death, some
theoreticians have proposed to conﬁrm such practice and redeﬁne death as
the irreversible halt of the capacity to be conscious.37 The proposal extends
to the deﬁnition of life. Indeed, a notion of human life symmetrical to cor-
tical death would specify the brain structures that demarcate the embryo
from the person.38 The onset and the end of a human person’s life anddeath
would depend on the existence or adequate functioning of certain portions
of the brain.
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39. See Ben LazareMijuskovic,The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments: The Simplicity, Unity, and
Identity of Thought from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant: A Study in the History of an Argument
(The Hague, 1974), esp. chap. 4.
40. On the seat of the soul, see Edwin Clarke and L. S. Jacyna,Nineteenth-CenturyOrigins of
Neuroscientiﬁc Concepts (Berkeley, 1987);Max Neuburger,The Historical Development of
Experimental Brain and Spinal Cord Physiology before Flourens (1897), trans. and ed. E. Clarke
(Baltimore, 1981). Be´la Re´ve´sz,Geschichte des Seelenbegriﬀes und der Seelenlokalisation (1917;
Amsterdam, 1966) is still useful. On the passage from the brain as organ of the soul to the problem
of cerebral localization, seeMichael Hagner,Homo cerebralis: DerWandel vom Seelenorgan zum
Gehirn (Berlin, 1997), chaps. 1 and 2.
41. A good synthesis is furnished by Jean-Noe¨lMissa, L’Esprit-cerveau: La Philosophie de l’esprit
a` la lumie`re des neurosciences (Paris, 1993).
42. SeeMichael Hagner and Cornelius Borck, “Brave Neuro-Worlds,”Neue Rundschau 110,
no. 3 (1999): 70–88.
43. Bynum—towhose workmine is deeply indebted—has renewed the history of the doctrine
of the resurrection of the body by emphasizing its link with questions of personal identity and
contemporary issues. See Bynum, “Material Continuity, Personal Survival, and the Resurrection
of the Body: A ScholasticDiscussion in Its Medieval andModern Contexts,” Fragmentation and
Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body inMedieval Religion (New York, 1992) and The
Resurrection of the Body.With one exception and the Lockean studies cited below (notes 72 and
81), there is to my knowledge no detailed historiography on resurrection debates after Aquinas.
The reduction of self to consciousness as a function of soul or brain is a
relatively late development. Only in the seventeenth century, under the in-
ﬂuence of Cartesian metaphysics, did emphasis on psychosomatic unity
shift to the unity of mind, the latter becoming the deﬁnitory element of
identity.39 Throughout the eighteenth century, the seat of the soul was
sought within the brain. The notion of a seat of the soul did not imply the
existence of an organ that was the soul but rather that of a structure where
body and soul would interact and operate the synthesis of sensations,
knowledge, and memory that constitute the foundation of personal iden-
tity. Starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the quest for a seat
of the soul was replaced by research on cerebral localizations and, later, ce-
rebral functions.40Thequestions left unresolved in theproblemareaof soul-
body relations are dealt with by neuroscientiﬁc investigations into the
mind-brain.41By the late twentieth century, thediscourses and interestssur-
rounding these investigations had turned the brain into a major fetish of
Western cultures.42 Extending toward the present the work of Caroline
Bynum, the history of postmedieval debates about the resurrection of the
body sketched here highlights these processes of disembodiment and neu-
ropsychologization of personal identity.43
The Christian Tradition
Inseparable from the mystery of the Incarnation—the Christ as God
made ﬂesh—the resurrection of the dead is the main promise and hope of
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44. Oscar Cullmannwent as far as maintaining that belief in the immortality of the soul was a
Platonizing import into a primitive Christian faith focused on the resurrection of the dead. See
Oscar Cullmann, Immortalite´ de l’aˆme ou Re´surrection des morts? Le Te´moignage du Nouveau
Testament (Neuchaˆtel, 1956).
45. This chronological range points to the meaning of tradition in relation to what I here
present as Christian theological and anthropological views. The RomanCatholic Church
considers that there exist revealed truths apart from those contained in the Bible. These truths are
formulated and elucidated in oral traditions, in the Gospels, and in theological writings. In
expounding them in its oﬃcial documents, the Church exerts its teaching authority or
magisterium.As highlighted by the extensive scholarly apparatus characteristic of such
documents, themagisterium is based on past texts, treated so as to bring about continuity of
content and interpretation. That tradition in this sense results from polemics and struggles,
anathema and excommunication, does not alter its function. To it belong both the doctrine of the
resurrection of the same carnal body and the view that there is no such a thing as a “disembodied
self.”
46. Such is The´odore’s opinion in the third conversation of “Entretiens sur la mort,” Entretiens
sur la me´taphysique, sur la religion et sur la mort (1711), in NicolasMalebranche,Oeuvres, ed.
Genevie`ve Rodis-Lewis, 2 vols. (Paris, 1992), 2:1038.
47. Ipse denotes a person or thing of which something is exclusively predicated and can
therefore stand for the reﬂexive pronoun; idem is used when two predicates are referred to the
same subject or as a word of comparison (“the same as . . . ”).
48. “Numerically identical”: if we bathe in a river, the water in which we swim remains only
qualitatively, not numerically the same. InDe principiis naturae,Aquinas’s example for things that
are numerically the same is “Socrates and this man, Socrates being pointed out” (quoted in Joseph
Bobik,Aquinas onMatter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the “De
Principiis Naturae” and the “DeMixtione Elementorum” of St. Thomas Aquinas [South Bend, Ind.,
the Christian religion.44 “Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the
dead, how say some among you that there be no resurrection of the dead?
But if there is no resurrection of the dead,” Saint Paul told the Corinthians,
“then Christ is not risen: and if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching
vain, and your faith is also vain” (1 Cor. 15:12–14). From the beginning of
Christianity to the most recent Roman Catholic catechism (1992) and be-
yond, the doctrine has ranked among the mysteries of faith.45 To the extent
that all we can know about it has been communicated by Revelation, it is
superﬂuous, as Malebranche put it, “de faire sur cela mille questions de
physique et de me´taphysique.”46 Yet that is precisely what generations of
theologians, philosophers, and naturalists have done as they tried to un-
derstand the conditions of resurrection, the continuity of the terrestrial and
the resurrected body, and the relation between body and person.
According to established doctrine, the bodily and psychological identity
of resurrected individuals will be the same as that of the persons they were
while alive. Identity, in the sense of the Latin ipse, necessitates sameness, in
the sense of idem.47 The reason why the doctrine of the resurrection is so
deeply involvedwith theproblemof identity lies in theparadoxicalassertion
that our resurrected bodies will be spiritual and yet numerically identical
(idem numero) to the the bodies of ﬂesh we possessed during our life on
earth.48 Here we have an organism that changes and yet, somehow, remains
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1998], pp. 90–91). For a study of the numerical identity of terrestrial and resurrected bodies, see
Francisco Segarra,De identitate corporis mortalis et corporis resurgentis (Madrid, 1929). Although
apologetic in intent, it contains useful historical information.
49. Augustine,De civitate Dei [The City of God against the Pagans], trans.WilliamM. Green
(Cambridge,Mass., 1972), bk. 22, chap. 21, p. 303; hereafter abbreviatedC.
the same. The aptness of Saint Augustine’s formulation has never been sur-
passed:
Hence the spiritual ﬂesh will be subject to spirit, but it will still be
ﬂesh, not spirit; just as the carnal spirit was subject to the ﬂesh, but
was still spirit, not ﬂesh. . . . And the man who is called spiritual in
this life is still carnal in respect to his body. . . . But he will be spiri-
tual in respect to his body as well when the same ﬂesh is raised so as
to fulﬁl the Scripture: “It is sown an animal body, it will rise a spiri-
tual body.”49
With little exaggeration, it may be said that, from the apostle Paul to Pope
John Paul II, the history of resurrection debates is a two-thousand-year-old
attempt at working out the oxymoron spiritual body.AmongChristians, the
fundamental issue never was whether resurrection would take place or
whether, resurrected, we will indeed be ourselves. God promised it andwill
therefore make it happen. The conceptual diﬃculty was to envision bodily
selfsameness and its relation to what it means to be ourselves. Will resur-
rected bodies be numerically identical to the corresponding terrestrial bod-
ies? If yes, how? And, if not, what will their qualitative identity depend on?
These questions date from the very beginning of Christianity. Thus re-
plied Paul to those who denied the resurrection:
But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? And with what
body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quick-
ened, except it die: and that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that
body that shall be, but bare grain, it may chance of wheat, or of some
other grain: but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to
every seed his own body. [1 Cor. 15:35–38]
Here we encounter the crucial metaphor of the seed, which aﬃrms the ne-
cessity and redeeming signiﬁcance of death and immediately directs res-
urrection discourses toward issues of decay, fertility, developmental
processes, continuity, and identity. To each kind of seed its ownbody.Then,
Paul continues,
so also with the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption; it
is raised in incorruption. It is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory;
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50. “Natural body” (other English versions say “physical” or “animal”) and “spiritual body” (in
the vulgate, corpus animale and corpus spiritale) translate soma psuchikon and soma pneumatikon.
51. Paul writes that the dead body will be “raised in glory” and “there is one glory of the sun,
and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars: for one star diﬀereth from another
star in glory” (1 Cor. 15:41). Brightness also corresponds to the body of the transﬁguredChrist,
whose “face did shine as the sun” and whose “raiment was white as the light” (Matthew 17:2; see
alsoMark 9:2–4, Luke 9:28–30).
52. See Gunnar af Ha¨llstrom,Carnis resurrectio: The Interpretation of a Credal Formula
(Helsinki, 1988). See also JohnNormanDavidson Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (London, 1950),
p. 165. For the Church Fathers, see the anthology of their writings by Joanne E. McWilliam
Dewart,Death and Resurrection (Wilmington,Del., 1986).
it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural body,
it is raised a spiritual body. [1 Cor. 15:42–44]50
The resurrection bodywill be a newbody, imperishable, glorious,powerful,
and spiritual. Yet it will be somehow identical to the terrestrial one.
Later exegesis endowed the body of the blessed with the qualities of im-
passibility, brightness, agility, and subtility. All resurrected bodies will be
incorruptible; but only those of the blessed will be impassible, feeling no
pain or discomfort. Brightness will be their proper “glory,” and it will be
proportionate to merit.51 Agility, the capacity ofmoving with total freedom
and celerity, represents the opposite of the terrestrial body’s weakness; it is
consistent with the resurrected Christ’s capacity to pass through material
objects. Subtility expresses the peculiar spirituality of a body governed by
the soul but incapable, in turn, to aﬀect it.
At the same time, the resurrected bodywill be carnal. This also conforms
to the palpable body of the risen Christ. In the Gospel of Luke, the Christ
appears suddenly in the midst of his disciples. In response to their terriﬁed
reaction, he tells them, “Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself:
handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not ﬂesh and bones, as ye see me have”
(Luke 24:39). As in the episode of Thomas’s incredulity, the physical body
is the sole source of certainty. Thosewho cannot believe on faith alonemust
perceive a carnal body through their senses. “Except I shall see in his hands
the print of the nails,” announced Thomas, “and put my ﬁnger into the
print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe” (John
20:25). Eight days later he placed his hand in Christ’s side—and believed.
To the Corinthians, Paul spoke of the “resurrection of the dead.” The
locution changed in the context of anti-Christian polemics. Irenaeus and
Tertullian, for example, emphasized the physical resurrection of the ﬂesh;
and the controversial backgroundmust have been at least partly responsible
for the choice of the word ﬂesh.52 The Apostles’ Creed declares, “I believe
in the resurrection of the ﬂesh,” and the belief thus formulated was re-
aﬃrmed by later professions of faith. In the fourth century, the Athanasian
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53. For all professions of faith, see HeinrichDenzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum: Deﬁnitionum
et declarationumde rebus ﬁdei et morum, ed. Adolf Scho¨nmetzer, 32d ed. (Freiburg-im-Breisgau,
1963).
54. John Paul II, “Propos sur la re´surrection” (1981), trans. Rene´ de Ceccaty, Le Temps de la
re´ﬂexion 3 (1982): 93.
55. See Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology, Death, and Eternal Life, trans.MichaelWaldstein, ed.
Aidan Nichols (Washington,D.C., 1988). On this point, as on others, Hans Ku¨ng, the suspended
Catholic theologian, is a powerful dissident voice. In Eternal Life? he treats resurrection as a
metaphor, as a way of saying the daily struggle against the “death” that aﬀects humankind at the
personal, intersubjective, and social levels. See Hans Ku¨ng, Eternal Life? Life after Death as a
Medical, Philosophical, and Theological Problem, trans. EdwardQuinn (London, 1984).
56. Origen,Contra Celsum [Against Celsus], trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge, 1953), bk. 5,
§ 14, p. 274. Celsus’s anti-Christian polemic,Alethes logos (On the True Doctrine), is known only
throughOrigen’s quotations.
Creed asserted that allmenwill be resurrectedwith their ownbodies (omnes
homines resurgere habent cum corporibus suis), and the Fides Damasi, that
we will be resurrected in the same ﬂesh in which we presently live (in hac
carne, qua nunc vivimus).53
Today’s Roman Catholic Church aﬃrms the numerical identity of ter-
restrial and resurrected ﬂesh. In 1981, Pope John Paul II explained that, in
the afterlife, human beings will keep their psychosomatic nature and that
the resurrection is a restoration “to the true life of human corporality.”54
The 1992 Catechism of the Catholic Church (§§ 988–1001) calls for a realist
understanding of the dogma. The previous great Catholic catechism, the
Professio ﬁdei tridentinae of 1564, incorporated the Nicene Creed of 381,
which speaks of the resurrection of the dead. Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger,
prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, points out
that the resurrection of the ﬂesh signiﬁes the resurrection of the “creature”
(the created being) only if it also implies the resurrectionof the body.55Such
assertions illustrate an anthropology that gives the body positive relevance;
The person exists only in an embodied form; possession of the same ﬂesh
attests to possession of the same self. Such are the basic convictions high-
lighted by the doctrine of the resurrection. The problem is how to under-
stand the notion of the same ﬂesh and its relation to identity.
In the earliest times of Christianity, attacks against the new religionoften
aimed at the resurrection belief. When the Athenians heard Saint Paul
preach it, “some mocked, and others said, We will hear thee again on this
matter” (Acts 17:32). Pagan critics questioned its possibility andraisedprob-
lems concerning the sameness of terrestrial and resurrected bodies. Circa
178, Celsus authored the ﬁrst comprehensive polemic against Christianity
and declared that, as a phenomenon, the resurrection of the dead was in-
comprehensible, that it would be contrary to God, and that the doctrine
proved the lack of spirituality of the new faith. Arising from the dead with
the self-same ﬂesh “is simply the hope of worms.”56 He and others such as
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57. Platonist arguments about the weight of bodies are discussed extensively inC, bk. 13,
chap. 18.
Plotinus’s disciple Porphyry in his treatise Against the Christians pointed
out the diﬃculties of imagining how corpseswill be recomposed. Itwas also
asked how resurrected bodies might possibly include all their original sub-
stance. In turn, Christian thinkers pondered the age, gender, and anatom-
ical makeup of the resurrected body and such questions as whether itwould
include sexual organs or all the matter cut out of nails and hair.
A good idea of the range of issues early Christian apologists had to tackle
in response to critics’ objections is given in the last book of Augustine’sDe
civitate Dei,which deals with the eternal happiness of the blessed asultimate
end of the city of God (see C, bk. 22). First, why should we doubt that it is
possible to “transfer” earthly bodies to a “heavenly home”? It is, after all,
not a “more marvellous work of God” than joining the soul with the body
(C, bk. 22, chap. 4, pp. 185, 189). Second, most nations already believe such
incredible things as the Christ’s resurrection and ascension to heaven; and
is it not unbelievable that a few unskilled men were able to persuade them
(see C, bk. 22, chap. 5)?
Platonist ratiocinatores think that the natural weight of the elements will
prevent an earthly body from being in heaven. Yet, Augustine asked, shall
we deny that God, who gave “lightness to the earthly bodies of birds,” can
make immortal human bodies “dwell even in the highest heaven” (C, bk.
22, chap. 11, p. 259)? And cannot an artisan shape a piece of metal so that it
will ﬂoat instead of sink?57 As for aborted fetuses, who lived and died in the
womb, it is impossible to decide whether they will be resurrected (see C,
bk. 22, chap. 13). Nevertheless, if they are among the dead, then there is no
reason to deny it. A fortiori, infants who die after birth will resurrect. But
what will be the form of their body? Not that in which they died. Rather,
“by a miracle of God [they] will receive in amoment the formwhichwould
have accrued to them at a later time” so that the resurrected body conforms
to its original design (ratio), that is, to what potentially existed in the seed
(C, bk. 22, chap. 14, pp. 274–75).
What will resurrected bodies look like? Will they all have the same size
as the Christ’s? No, answers Augustine: “each one is to receive his ownmea-
sure,” but in a state of youth that corresponds to the age and strength Jesus
reached before his death (C, bk. 22, chap. 15, p. 277). As for women, their
defects will disappear just as from all other bodies, and their sex will be
preserved, for it “is not a defect, but a natural state.” Since in heaven there
will be no intercourse or childbirth, female parts will be suited for a “new
beauty” that does not provoke lust, but inspires “praise of the wisdom and
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58. See Augustine,The Enchiridion of Faith, Hope, and Love, trans. pub. (Washington, 1996),
chap. 89, pp. 103–4.
59. See Aristotle,De anima, 412a.20.
goodness of God” (C, bk. 22, chap. 17, p. 281). Such preservation of organs
is consistent with Jesus’s words, “But there shall not an hair of your head
perish” (Luke 21:18). Augustine realizes that, for hair as well as deformities,
matter cannot be restored to its original location (C, bk. 22, chap. 19). Res-
urrected bodies will therefore comprise all their terrestrial substance but
distribute this substance diﬀerently, as when a statue is redone after having
been melted down, or a pot’s clay is reused to make a new pot.58 Martyrs’
bodies will perhaps show the scars of their “gloriouswounds,” but thesewill
be an honor, “and in their body will shine a certain beauty, not of body, but
of virtue” (C, bk. 22, chap. 19, p. 295).
However disintegrated and scattered, all bodies, even those devoured by
beasts or cannibals, will be made whole (see C, bk. 22, chap. 20). In sum,
only let every deformity be excluded, every weakness, impediment or
decay, and whatever else is not suited to a kingdom in which the sons
of the resurrection and the promise will be equal to the angels of
God—if not in body, or age, at least in happiness. [C, bk. 22, chap. 20,
p. 301]
All this is to be cautiously asserted. The promise of resurrection and eternal
life cannot be doubted. “But,” concludes Augustine, “since we have had no
experience as yet to tell us what this spiritual body is, or how great its beauty
is, I suspect that all utterance published concerning it is rash” (C, bk. 22,
chap. 21, p. 303).
The most puzzling diﬃculty concerned the substance of persons eaten
by cannibals or by animals who were in turn eaten by humans. Some early
Christian responses to this objection employed physiological arguments. In
De resurrectione mortuorum (chaps. 5–8), the second-century Athenian
apologist Athenagoras claimed that human ﬂesh cannot assimilate human
ﬂesh. Two hundred years later, Augustine explained that, because all di-
gested matter eventually dissipates into the air, God can easily retrieve it
and return it to their original possessors (see C, bk. 22, chaps. 12, 20).
Although no new doubts about the resurrection were raised after the
second century, Christian theologians kept examining the earlier ones and
advancing new replies. In the process, bodily identity and continuity re-
mained crucial, and replies to objections were consistently framed so as to
preserve the numerical identity of matter.
In the thirteenth century, ThomasAquinas adopted theAristotelianview
that soul is the “form” of a natural body that potentially has life.59 Soul and
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60. See Aquinas, Summa theologica, suppl. QQ. 78, art. 3, 5:2876–77; and QQ. 79, art. 1–2,
5:2877–81.
61. See Anton C. Pegis, “The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St. Thomas,” in Saint Thomas
Aquinas, 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies, ed. ArmandMaurer et al., 2 vols. (Toronto, 1974),
1:131–58.
62. “Anima . . . non est totus homo, et animamea non est ego“ (Aquinas, “Super primam
epistolam ad Corinthios lectura,” in Super epistolas S. Pauli lectura, ed. Raphael Cai, 2 vols.
[Torino/Rome, 1953], 1:411, chap. 15, lect. 2, no. 924).
body accomplish themselves only when joined to each other. This must be
understood in relation to Aquinas’s ontology. As he explained in De prin-
cipiis naturae, in things that are numerically one, both the form and the
matter are numerically one. But, following Aristotle, he considered that
matter is only potentiality; this potential somethingdeprivedofactualbeing
can become actuality through the form. Sperm (matter) is potentially a hu-
man being, but becomes this being through soul (form). In the case of a
bronze statue, we have matter (the bronze that is potentially a statue), pri-
vation (the shapelessness of matter), and form (the shape by which we call
it a statue). When applied to the issue of identity, this ontology reinforced
the paradoxical nature of the resurrection doctrine.
At the moment of death, the soul departs from the body. The body dis-
integrates, and the corpse, according to Thomas, does not have a natural
inclination to resurrect. At resurrection, its fragments rejoin the soul that
originally animated them only by virtue of a providential law. Aquinas con-
siders resurrected bodies as numerically identical to terrestrial bodies but
implies that same matter is that which is animated by the same form.60
Ultimately, then, it is the sameness of soul-as-form that accounts for iden-
tity and spatiotemporal continuity. However, as form is not itself being but
that by which something has being, it is impossible (except by conceptual
abstraction) to separate body and soul; and this applies to resurrected bod-
ies as much as to anything else. Thus, Aquinas’s apparent spiritualization
of identity did not entail a neglect of body. On the contrary, insofar as the
essence of soul is to be the formof body, embodiment is by nature its proper
condition. The resurrection of the body will therefore remove the contra
naturam condition of separated souls.61 Accordingly, Aquinas dealt indetail
with the same contentious issues as his predecessors (hair, nails, sexual or-
gans, aborted fetuses, cannibalism). As he wrote, “the soul . . . is not the
whole man, and my soul is not I.”62 The resurrected body will be a trans-
formed body; it will be glorious and spiritual, but it will also be the same
as a terrestrial body and just as material.
Resurrection and Natural Philosophy
The solutions of the Church Fathers and other medieval theologiansdid
not placate the trouble produced by pagan objections, and each generation
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63. Catechismus Romanus [Catechism of the Council of Trent for Parish Priests], trans. John A.
McHugh and Charles Callan (Rockford, Ill., 1982), pt. 1, art. 11, pp. 120, 122.
64. John Tillotson, “The Possibility of the ResurrectionAsserted and Proved” (1682),TheWorks
of Dr. John Tillotson (London, 1820), 8:339.
65. See Jean Bodin,Colloquium of the Seven about Secrets of the Sublime, trans.Marion Leathers
Daniels Kuntz (Princeton, N.J., 1975), bk. 3.
66. Milton,De doctrina christiana (ca. 1658–65), ed. Frank Allen Patterson et al., vol. 16 of The
Works of JohnMilton, trans. Charles R. Sumner, ed. JamesHolly Hanford andWaldoHilary Dunn
(New York, 1934), p. 353.
67. John Bunyan,The Resurrection of the Dead (1665), ed. J. SearsMcGee, vol. 3 of The
MiscellaneousWorks of John Bunyan, ed. Roger Shattuck (Oxford, 1987), p. 224.
looked for new solutions. In the Early Modern period, however, resurrec-
tion discourses became increasingly diﬀerentiated. Poetry and the visual
arts emphasized the most carnal aspects; theology expounded the doctrine;
and alchemists and natural philosophers tried to explain the processes
whereby resurrection might take place.
In presenting the creed, the Catechism of Trent pointed out that, in con-
trast to other articles, the resurrection of the body is not only proposed by
the Scriptures “to the belief of the faithful, but is also conﬁrmed by nu-
merous arguments,” and it admitted that “analogies fromnature”areuseful
to show that the doctrine does not contradict nature or human reason.63
As stated by a seventeenth-century archbishop of Canterbury, “the resur-
rection is not a thing incredible to natural reason.”64 But for him, as for all
earlier and later Christian thinkers, faith remained the sole foundation;and
theology’s mission was to assert the doctrine’s truth. The Reformer John
Calvin did so in several places of his work; in his 1544 Brieve instruction
against the Anabaptists, he defended its ultimate basis, the humanity of
Christ. In the third book of Jean Bodin’sColloquiumheptaplomeres(written
1588), an extended dialogue on the “secrets of the sublime” between a skep-
tic, a philosophical naturalist, a Jew, a Muslim, a Catholic, a Calvinist, and
a Lutheran, the Christians assert their belief in the resurrection of the ﬂesh
but do not seek to oppose physical arguments to the naturalist’s objec-
tions.65 John Milton, whose rejection of the Trinity and the immortality of
the soul made him look heretical in the context of the Restoration, was
absolutely certain “that every man will rise numerically one and the same
person.”66 None of these very diﬀerent authors dealt with naturalistic ob-
jections. Neither did John Bunyan, the mystical and didactic author of Pil-
grim’s Progress, though he likened the formation of the resurrected body to
the apothecary’s candying of a sour substance that nevertheless “doth still
retain its own proper Nature and Essence.”67
Outside strictly theological discourse, however, naturalistic arguments
were prominent. Used since Athenagoras in the second century to respond
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68. See JacquesMarx, “Alchimie et palinge´ne´sie,” Isis 62 (Sept. 1971): 275–89. On how
palingenesis experiments ﬁt in the epistemological and argumentative framework of atomism
(and for further references), see ChristophMeinel, “Early Seventeenth-Century Atomism:
Theory, Epistemology, and the Insuﬃciency of Experiment,” Isis 79 (Mar. 1988): 68–103; see esp.
pp. 78–81.
69. Soteriology, from the Greek soterion, “salvation,” is the branch of theology that deals with
salvation (especially through Christ). The soteriological dimension of alchemy is not directly
aimed at a physico-theologyof resurrection. In the thirteenth century, the Oxford Franciscan
Roger Bacon looked for ways to give the body incorruptibility and prolonged youth through
alchemy, not for youth’s sake, but to prepare it for resurrection and eternal life. The chief means
was the consumption of drinkable gold, the incorruptiblematter par excellence and a symbol of
the equilibriumof the microcosm; see Agostino Paravicini Bagliani, “Storia della scienza e storia
della mentalita`: Ruggero Bacone, Bonifacio VIII e la teoria della ‘prolongatio vitae,’” inAspetti
della letteratura latina nel secolo XIII, ed. Claudio Leonardi and Giovanni Orlandi (Spoleto, 1992),
pp. 243–80. After the Reformation, alchemy became entangled with apocalyptic expectations. Its
success during the seventeenth century is linked to the perception that it carried “the secret of life
itself, and with it the secrets of resurrection, of immortality, of perfection, of ﬁnal salvation and
Beatitude” (Betty Jo Teeter Dobbs, “Alchemical Death and Resurrection: The Signiﬁcance of
Alchemy in the Age of Newton,” in Science, Pseudo-science, and Utopianism in EarlyModern
Thought, ed. Stephen A.McKnight [Columbia, 1992], p. 87).
70. For the emblematics of resurrection, see Filippo Picinelli,Mundus symbolicus, in
emblematum universitate formatus, explicatus, et tam sacris, quam profanis eruditionibus ac
sententiis illustratus (1669), facs. 1694 ed., trans. August Erath, 2 vols., Index applicationum(New
York, 1976), s.v. “Resurrectiomortuorum.”
71. Signatures are analogical signs of the essence, purpose, and use of things (a yellow ﬂower is
good for jaundice, the powder of a rhinoceros’s horn, eﬀective as a male aphrodisiac).
72. See Franc¸ois Garasse, La Doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps, ou pretendus tels,
contenant plusieurs maximes pernicieuses a` la religion, a` l’estat, et aux bonnes moeurs (Paris, 1623),
p. 296. The Egyptianswere supposed to use furnaces as incubators and thus to be able to produce
cheaply a vast number of chicks. The process was examined in some detail by the anatomist
to the food chain objection, they are the core of alchemical reasoning. Al-
chemists found that the ashes of certain plants become the germs of new
plants; resurrection thus became an instance of “palingenesis,” the new
birth or resuscitation of a disintegrated mineral, vegetal, or animal body.68
In such a context, explanations of Paracelsian inspirationmingled with the
soteriological sense of alchemical symbolism.69 Mercury, for example, after
its reduction to dust ormixture with other substances, can recover its initial
integrity and purity thanks to mechanical actions or by being heated in a
special vase. Emblems of the resurrection evoke these operationswhen they
depict a vase accompanied by the legend Redivivus a pulvere or Redivivus
ab urna.70 In a universe organized by correspondences of microcosm and
macrocosm and ﬁlled with “signatures,” emblems such as those related to
mercury exhibited thenaturalmechanismswhereby resurrectioncouldtake
place.71 Both literally and ﬁguratively, alchemical manipulations for recon-
stituting substances were physical models for the resurrection. That, pre-
cisely, is what motivated a seventeenth-century Jesuit’s bitter reproach that,
for alchemists, the resurrection was as natural as the birth of a chicken in
the furnaces of Egypt.72
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Johann Vesling; see JohannVesling, “Observationes philosophicae&medicae de pullorum in
Aegypto exclusionemediante calore elementari,” Joannis Veslingi mindani equitis observationes
anatomica& epistolaemedicae ex schedis posthumis, ed. Thomas Bartholin (1664; The Hague,
1740), chap. 1. On the period, seeMarie-Madeleine Fragonard, “De la re´surrection des morts, et de
sa justiﬁcation rationnelle a` la ﬁn du XVIe sie`cle,” in L’Imaginaire du changement en France au
XVIe sie`cle, ed. Claude-Gilbert Dubois (Bordeaux, 1984), pp. 79–100.
73. See Udo Thiel, “Individuation,” in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century
Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber andMichael Ayers, 2 vols. (New York, 1998), 1:212–64.
74. Eucharist, is from the Greek eucharistos, “grateful,” and eucharistia, “thanksgiving.” The
eucharist or communion is a Christian sacrament in which consecrated bread and wine (also
called species in Roman Catholicism) are consumed as a memorial of Christ’s death. It is based on
the Last Supper taken together by Jesus and the apostles; seeMatt. 26:26–28; see also John 22:17–20.
75. Council of Trent,Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent, ed. H. J. Schroeder (1551;
London, 1971), session 13, canon I, and “Decree Concerning the Most Holy Sacrament of the
Eucharist,” chap. 1, p. 73.
Resurrection and the “New Philosophy”
The physico-theology of resurrection appears to have changed radically
during the seventeenth century in connection with the critique of Aristo-
telianism and with the corpuscular and mechanistic conception of nature.
On the one hand, embryology became the model for resurrection mecha-
nisms and called into question the notion of life as a product of death. On
the other hand, the visible properties of bodies were no longer accidents,
manifestations of an underlying substance that functioned as a neutral sub-
stratum characterized by potentiality. Rather, they were the result of the
number, motion, and position of particles that were the same for all bodies.
It is in this context that the question of what constitutes sameness at dif-
ferent times took precedence over the traditional question of individuation
(what produces individuality).73
Seventeenth-century natural corpuscularism strengthenedearlierbeliefs
in the universal transmutability of substances. To the extent that things do
not diﬀer in their ultimate material components, they can be, in principle,
transformed into anything else. The atomistic foundation of transmuta-
bility was deemed incompatible with the eucharistic doctrine of theRoman
Catholic Church.74 Against various Protestant interpretations, the Council
of Trent aﬃrmed the Christ’s “real presence”; that is, in the eucharist, Jesus
Christ is “truly, really, and substantially” contained in the consecratedbread
and wine.75 Real presence resulted from transubstantiation—transforma-
tion of the whole substance of the consecrated species into the substance of
Christ’s body. But it did not change the external appearance of the bread
and thewine. The corpuscularianphilosophy, however, implied that amod-
iﬁcation of themechanical dispositions of abody’s composingparticlespro-
duces outward transformations. The problem for the resurrection of the
body is the converse. In the eucharist as deﬁned in Roman Catholicism,
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76. As noted by the Jansenist theologian Antoine Arnauld, the accusation that atomism
undermined the doctrine of the resurrected body was rarely formulated. In part three of his
Examen du traite´ de l’essence du corps contre Descartes,written in 1680, he argued (against the claim
that glorious bodies could not be extended, but must be conﬁned to an indivisiblemathematical
point) that the Cartesian notion of matter was not incompatiblewith the materiality and qualities
of the glorious body. See Antoine Arnauld, Examen du traite´ de l’essence du corps contre Descartes,
ed. Emmanuel Faye (Paris, 1999).
77. John Locke,An Essay ConcerningHumanUnderstanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Clarendon,
1979); hereafter abbreviated EC; unless otherwise indicated, all references are drawn from bk. 2,
chap. 27.
appearance is maintained while the underlying substance becomes totally
other. In resurrection, the body is radically transformed, but its numerical
identity is maintained. In the case of the eucharist, the corpuscular philos-
ophy questioned change; in the case of the resurrection, it questioned per-
manence.76 As a consequence, it drastically limited the role of numerical
sameness. It did this in two basic frameworks, the psychological and the
physico-theological, which combined with each other as well as with em-
bryological and neurological considerations.
The Psychological Framework
In the chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” added to the second edition
of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1694), John Locke set forth
what is arguably one of his fundamental philosophical innovations: thesep-
aration between substance and personal identity.77 The theory starts with
the distinction between man and person. The identity of the man consists
in “a participation of the same continuedLife . . . in successionvitallyunited
to the same organized body”; nobody, Locke commented, “couldhe be sure
that the soul ofHeliogabaluswere in one of his hogs, would yet say that hog
were a Man or Heliogabalus” (EC, § 6, p. 332). In contrast, the person is
deﬁned as “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reﬂection, and
can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing, in diﬀerent times and
places” (EC, § 9, p. 335). Personal identity, therefore, resides in a continuity
of memory and consciousness, in “the sameness of a rational Being: and as
far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or
thought, so far reaches the identity of that person” (EC, § 9, p. 335). Personal
identity depends exclusively on the “same consciousness that makes aMan
be himself to himself,” regardless of the substances to which consciousness
is “annexed” (EC, § 10, p. 336). It follows that self (which is for Locke that
which the word person names [see EC, § 26, pp. 346–47]) also depends on
consciousness and not substance. Thus, if my little ﬁnger is severed from
my hand and my consciousness happens to stay with it, “‘tis evident the
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78. Locke,A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians,
Romans, Ephesians (1707), ed. ArthurW.Wainwright (Oxford, 1987), p. 252n.
79. Letter to D.Whitby, 17 Jan. 1698–99, quoted inMaria-CristinaPitassi, “Une Re´surrection
pour quel corps et pour quelle humanite´? La Re´ponse lockienne entre philosophie, exe´ge`se, et
the´ologie,”Rivista di storia della ﬁlosoﬁa, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 61.
80. “Le tournant de la re´ﬂexion et de la me´moiremarquait en fait un renversement conceptuel
ou` l’ipse´ite´ se substituait silencieusement a` la meˆmete´” (Paul Ricoeur, Soi-meˆme comme un autre
[Paris, 1990], p. 151).
81. Sketches of the debates are given in JohnW. Yolton,A Locke Dictionary (Oxford, 1993),
pp. 233–37, and Locke: An Introduction, ed. Yolton (Oxford, 1985), pp. 97–98. For fuller treatments,
see Alan P. F. Sell, John Locke and the Eighteenth-CenturyDivines (Cardiﬀ, 1997), pp. 250–62, and
Thiel, “Personal Identity,” in The CambridgeHistory of Seventeenth-CenturyPhilosophy.The
matter is also treated in Philip C. Almond,Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment England,who
wrongly states that, for Locke, “the resurrection of the ﬂesh was not necessary” (Philip C. Almond,
little ﬁnger would be the Person, the same Person; and self then would have
nothing to do with the rest of the Body” (EC, § 17. p. 341).
At resurrection, it is of course the person that counts. Indeed, memory
is crucial for judgment and imputation. Sentences passed on JudgmentDay
will be justiﬁed by the consciousness resurrected persons will have of being
the same as those who committed the actions for which they are rewarded
or punished; and this will be so, Locke declared, “in what Bodies soever”
the resurrected appear. Being rewarded or punished in the absence of such
consciousnesswould amount to the injustice of being createdhappyormis-
erable, “without any demerit at all” (EC, § 26, p. 347). In Locke’s view, dif-
ﬁculties with the resurrection doctrine are solvedby thedistinctionbetween
man and person and by the identiﬁcation of self with the latter. For while
body and soul together make the man (and controversies are related to the
body), it becomes possible, thanks to the new theory, “withoutanydiﬃculty
to conceive, the same Person at the resurrection, though in a Body not ex-
actly in make or parts the same which he had here” (EC, § 15, p. 340). Locke
drew the corollary of such considerations in his theological commentaries,
where he emphasized that “those who are raised to an heavenly state shall
have other bodies.”78 As he wrote in a letter, “I being fully perswaded of the
resurrection and that we shall have bodys ﬁtted to that state it is indiﬀerent
to me whether any one concludes that they shall be the same or not.”79
In sum, Locke’s solution consistedof redeﬁning the termsof thequestion
and of emptying the self from the body and the body from the self. The
sameness (idem) of terrestrial and resurrectedbodies ceased tobe acriterion
for determining the identity (ipse) of resurrected persons. In the words of
Paul Ricoeur, Locke’s conception marks a turning point in which “ipsity”
replaces sameness.80 From then on, personal identitywouldbebasedalmost
exclusively on psychological properties. It was immediately realized that
Locke’s theory threatened the received dogma of the resurrection of nu-
merically same bodies.81 The Lockean reduction of the anthropological
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Heaven and Hell in Enlightenment England [Cambridge, 1994], p. 141; see also pp. 131–43). Directly
relevant to the issues discussed here are Etienne Balibar, John Locke: Identite´ et diﬀe´rence:
L’Invention de la conscience (Paris, 1998); EdwinMcCann, “Locke’s Philosophy of Body,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere Chappell (New York, 1994), pp. 56–88; Nicholas Jolley,
Leibniz and Locke: A Study of the New Essays on HumanUnderstanding (Oxford, 1984), chap. 7;
and RaymondMartin, “Locke’s Psychology of Personal Identity,” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 38 (Jan. 2000): 41–61.
problem of identity to the legal and moral concept of person seems to have
been rarely understood by early theological controversialists (and was, in
any case, rejected); but a number of naturalists who accepted it did not give
up the body entirely when pondering the resurrection. Locke’s severing of
self from questions of numerical material identity thus converged with the
physico-theological consequences of the corpuscularian and mechanical
philosophy.
The Physico-theological Framework
The defense of the corpuscularian and mechanistic theory of matter, in
opposition to Aristotelian hylomorphism and the explanation of natural
phenomena by forms and qualities, runs through thework of Robert Boyle.
Like Newton and other ﬁgures of the “new philosophy,” Boyle did not keep
mechanics, alchemy, and religion strictly separate. Particularly relevant for
us are his attempts at demonstrating the existence of primary particles as
the ultimate components of matter by showing that certain properties of
substances can persist through chemical and physical transformations.
Thus, he interpreted the “redintegration of salt-petre” (of which he wrote
in Certain Physiological Essays of 1661) in terms of the mechanical modiﬁ-
cations of particles that do not diﬀer qualitatively from one substance to
another. Substances, and therefore bodies, diﬀer as a result of variations in
the number, position, and motion of the composing particles. He often
cited, and claimed to have replicated, Jan Baptista van Helmont’s experi-
ment. Plant a young tree in a previously weighted amount of earth; water
it carefully; let it grow; then control the weight of the earth. You will notice
that it has barely diminished. Conclusion: the water has been transformed
into wood. For Boyle, this observation conﬁrmed that all bodies are made
of a uniform matter and validated the universal transmutability of sub-
stances:
I would not say, that any thing can immediately be made of every
thing . . . yet since bodies, having but one common matter, can be dif-
ferenced but by accidents, which seem all of them to be the eﬀects and
consequents of local motion, I see not, why it should be absurd to
think that . . . by the intervention of some very small addition or sub-
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82. Quoted in Richard S.Westfall,The Construction of Modern Science:Mechanism and
Mechanics (New York, 1977), pp. 77–78.
83. Some things, Locke explained in the Essay ConcerningHumanUnderstanding, are “according
to Reason” (propositionswhose truth can be established by deduction or by tracing ideas formed
by sensation and reﬂexion, such as the existence of God); others are “above Reason” (propositions
whose truth or probability cannot be established in the same way, such as the resurrection of the
dead); and yet others are “contrary to Reason” (propositions inconsistent or irreconcilablewith
“our clear and distinct Ideas,” such as the existence of more than one God) (EC, bk. 4, chap. 17,
§ 23, p. 687).
84. Robert Boyle, “Some Physico-theologicalConsiderations about the Possibility of the
Resurrection” (1675),TheWorks of the Honourable Robert Boyle, 2d ed. (London, 1772), vol. 4;
hereafter abbreviated “S.”
85. The “hand of the Lord” takes Ezekiel to a valley of dry bones. God orders him to prophesy
that the bones shall be covered with sinews, ﬂesh, and skin, and will live. As he prophesied, there
was a noise and a shaking, and the bones came together. Then God breathed upon them, “and
they lived, and stood up upon their feet, an exceeding great army” (Ez. 37:1–11). Although in
Ezekiel the scene is said to symbolize the fate of the “house of Israel,” Christians saw in it an
announcement and conﬁrmation of the resurrection of the dead.
traction of matter . . . and of an orderly series of alterations . . . almost
of any thing, may at length be made any thing.82
What such certainties meant for the physical conditions of the resurrection
will be immediately apparent.
As for Locke, the resurrection of the dead was for Boyle “above
reason.”83 This meant only that its truth or probability can be established
neither by deduction nor by tracing our idea of it from sensation and re-
ﬂexion. Resurrection will result from divine intervention; that it will take
place is not probable but absolutely certain. Nevertheless, because it cannot
be contrary to reason or the laws of nature its rank as amystery of Christian
faith does not preclude examining its natural feasibility. This is precisely
what Boyle does in “Some Physico-theological Considerations about the
Possibility of the Resurrection” (1675).84
Boyle begins by arguing for a notion of identity he characterizes asmore
ﬂexible than the then-current one and closer to that of early Christianity.
Indeed, because during our lifetimes we lose and renewmost of our bodily
substance, why demand that the totality of the original matter be restored
at resurrection? A classical alchemical observation supported theargument.
Burn a poppy and plant its ashes; a new plant will arise. This shows that a
“plastick,” form-giving power remains in the “ﬁxed,” nonvolatile particles
of the plant. Boyle thinks that accounting for the physical possibility of the
resurrection does not even require such a power. The original creation of
man suﬃces to demonstrate God’s ability tomake bodies. In addition, Eze-
kiel’s vision (ﬁg. 1) shows “that a portion of thematter of a dead body, being
united with a far greater portion of matter furnished from without by God
himself, and completed into a human body, may be reputed the sameman,
that was dead before” (“S,” p. 195).85 The continuity of the resurrected and
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the terrestrial person, therefore, does not necessitate the numerical identity
of physical bodies.
Similar considerations allow Boyle to reply to the traditional objections.
A body may contain corpuscles that belonged to another body without, for
that reason, losing its properties. This is evident from operations with gold
and mercury and by analogous phenomena from the plant and animal
world (butter can taste like the herbs eatenby the cows that furnish themilk;
some marine birds have a ﬁshy ﬂavor). Moreover, the body is in “perpetual
ﬂux,” and only bones are durable. There is therefore “no determinate bulk
or size, that is necessary to make a human body pass for the same” (“S,”
p. 196). In conclusion, diﬀerences amongphysical bodies donotderive from
the nature of their substance but from the mechanical properties of the
qualitatively identical particles that compose them. It is possible tomodify
these properties so as to return a body to an earlier state, and that is what
God will do with our corpses at the end of time. God, indeed, can do ev-
erything and anything with the principles of matter andmotion. “And that
his power extends to the re-union of a soul and body, we may learn from
the experiments God has been pleased to give of it in the Old Testament
and the New, especially in the raising again to life Lazarus andChrist” (“S,”
p. 200).
The glorious body will be made of true ﬂesh, but the disposition of its
particles will give rise to new qualities, the four traditional dotes corporis
gloriosi. Again, this is the work of God, who can endow bodies with such
extraordinary features by temporarily suspending the usual course of na-
ture. Several biblical episodes provide Boyle with appropriatemodels. God
made an iron axe come aﬂoat from the river Jordan (2 Kings 6:1–7); andHe
protected Daniel’s companions in Nebuchadnezzar’s furnace (Dan. 3). On
those occasions, God cancelled the “native gravity” of the iron and the ac-
tion of the ﬂame (“S,” p. 201).
In less miraculous terms, the conversion of terrestrial bodies into glo-
rious bodies is understood by analogy to chemical transformations. Boyle
seems delighted to report that he manufactured transparent, ﬁnely colored
glass out of dark, opaque lead. Finally, he notes rather poetically, we can
light a candle that has just been put oﬀ by approaching a ﬂame to its still-
smoking wick. This is for him a good image for the manner in which the
glorious body will arise. “For, in the twinkling of an eye, an opacous, dark,
languid and stinking smoke loses all its stink, and is changed into a most
active penetrant and shining body” (“S,” p. 202).
The gist of Boyle’s argument is that since no one particular portion of
matter determines personal identity, the sameness of the terrestrial and the
resurrected individual is not to be judged by material criteria. The soul, in
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Leibniz, Examen religionis christianae [Systema theologicum] (1686?), in vol. 4, pt. C, Sa¨mtliche
Schriften und Briefe, ser. 6 [Philosophische Schriften] (Berlin, 1999), no. 420, p. 2453; and “De
resurrectione corporum,” appendix to “Leibniz fu¨r Herzog Johann Friedrich: De Usu et
necessitate DemonstrationumImmortalitatisAnimae” (1671), in ibid., ser. 2 [Philosophischer
Briefwechsel], vol. 1 (Berlin, 1987), no. 59, pp. 115–17.
87. Thomas Burnet,A Treatise Concerning the State of the Departed Souls, Before, and At, and
After, the Resurrection (1723), trans. “Mr. Dennis,” 2d ed. (London, 1739); hereafter abbreviatedT.
his view, “shall be again united, not to an aetherial, or the like ﬂuidmatter,
but to such a substance as may, with tolerable propriety of speech . . . be
called a human body” (“S,” p. 201). The basic, minimal substance must be
nonvolatile and possess plastic power. In a similar argument, and also citing
resurrected plants, Leibniz speculated that each body possesses a “ﬂower of
substance” endowed with a “seminal power.”86 The conservation of such
“ﬂower” could account for the physical possibility of resurrection. Again,
numerical identity is no longer the ultimate criterion for individualidentity,
nor for the identity between terrestrial and resurrected bodies.
Physiology and Neuropsychology of Resurrection
Physico-theology and psychology converged toward thedisembodiment
of self; but neither alchemical nor mechanical models could determine the
“portion of the matter of a dead body” necessary for resurrection. The task
of doing so belonged to the life sciences. Two approaches emerged in the
context of resurrection debates. One tried to identify the minimal, sine qua
non structures of living bodies; another aimedatdiscoveringdevelopmental
principles responsible for the formation of resurrected bodies. But I should
ﬁrst illustrate an alternative to the approaches of corpuscularian mecha-
nism and solidist physiology—a theory that, though partially combined
with them, emphasized the role of ﬂuids and saw nature as both animated
by vital and psychical forces and as irreducible to matter in motion.
In A Treatise Concerning the State of Departed Souls, the Scottish jurist
and theologian Thomas Burnet, best known for his Sacred Theory of the
Earth (1681), considered that resurrected bodies will be like those of angels
and that anatomical questions are therefore irrelevant.87 The whole debate
on numerical identity seemed to him “rather curious than necessary.”
“How can it concern us,” he wondered, “what becomes of our Leavings,
and Carkasses, provided we live in the Light of Heaven, and in the Society
of Angels?” (T, p. 232). Obviously, God can again fashion our bodies with
the original particles. It would be, Burnet wrote, “the most astonishing of
all Miracles. But of such a Miracle, so manifold, and so useless, we have
86. In (al)chemical terminology, “ﬂower” (ﬂos) designates the substance obtained by
“sublimation” (that is, volatilization) and consisting of very ﬁne particles; see GottfriedWilhelm
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88. HumphryHody, The Resurrection of the (Same) Body Asserted, from the Traditions of the
Heathens, the Ancient Jews, and the Primitive Church (London, 1694); hereafter abbreviatedR.
89. Also: “The Identity of the Rising Body, or its samenesswith that which died, can consist in
nothing else but in the Restauration of the same Particles of Matter, whichmade up the necessary
Parts of the dying Body, to their former Construction” (R, p. 192).
hitherto had no Example. Thus much [he concluded] concerning the In-
signiﬁcance and the Impertinence of the Thing” (T, p. 243).
Still, Burnet did not shy from examining the resurrected body’s special
features. That it will be celestial yet material means that it will be, like
Christ’s, composed of amatter “as pure and thin, as the ﬁnest Air orÆther”
(T, p. 209). As spiritual matter, it will be made of “spirits,” extremely ten-
uous ﬂuids, thanks to which it will conserve itself “withoutMeat, orDrink,
or Sleep” (T, p. 209–10). As for its agility, it “does not proceed from thehard
Body, but from some other subtle Matter in Motion inclos’d in the hard
Body” (T, p. 210). The resurrected body will therefore be “spirituous” (thus
were called in chemistry the most volatile and light substances)—“nothing
but a Frame of congregated Spirits and of the noblest Matter” (T, p. 212).
Finally, it will be “glorious” because of a celestial light inherent in it, as in
the face of the transﬁgured Christ (T, p. 214). Burnet’s view of the resur-
rected body is closer to a pneumatology (theory of disembodied spirits)
than to a physiology; but this pneumatology itself is thephysiologyof abody
composed of a “spirituous” substance.
One’s “Own Body”
At the end of the seventeenth century, the English divine Humphrey
Hody, who becameRegius professor ofGreek atOxford, producedanentire
treatise (against Locke) in defense of the doctrine of the resurrection of the
same body.88 Hody agreedwith Boyle that sameness of body did not depend
on the numerical sameness of each and every particle but tried to specify
the selfsame particles an individual glorious body must share with the cor-
responding terrestrial one. “T’is enough,” he remarked, “that suchParticles
are rais’d as made up the integrant and necessary Parts of the Body” (R,
pp. 187–88). The key notion is that of necessary parts.89 Hody deﬁned them
as “those which remain after the utmost degree of Maceration, without
which the Body would not be Integral, but Imperfect.” What were they?
Bones, skin, nerves, tendons, ligaments, “and the Substance of the several
Vessels.” As long as these remain, he assured, “the body is truly Whole”;
ﬂesh added to themmakes no diﬀerence to its integrality. Hody could thus
solve the ancient cannibalism objection: the necessary parts “are not so apt
for Nourishment” (R, p. 188).
As far as identity is concerned,Hodywas categorical: “WecannotbeMen
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90. See BernardNieuwentijt,The Religious Philosopher, or the Right Use of Contemplating the
Works of the Creator (1714), trans. J. Chamberlayne, 3 vols. (London, 1718), vol. 3, contemplation
28; hereafter abbreviatedRP.
unless we have Humane Bodies.” His refusal to follow Locke’s distinction
between man and person is absolute. He declared,
we cannot be the same Men unless we have the same Bodies. T’is a
great Mistake to imagine that the Identity or Sameness of a Man con-
sists wholly in the sameness of the Soul. If Euphorbus, and Homer, and
Ennius, had had one and the same Soul, yet they would not have been
one and the same, but Three distinctMen. [R, p. 218]
Three bodies animated by the same soul remain distinct—not merely as
bodies but as full persons. Hody’s position is as radically diﬀerent from
Locke’s as from the identiﬁcation of our selves to the contents of the brain.
Bodies, therefore, were considered integral to persons. Yet, given the
changes bodies undergo during a lifetime, what constitutes a person’s own
body? The question was examined in those very terms in the chapter on the
“possibility of resurrection” of The Religious Philosopher, a major natural
theology by the Dutch naturalist, philosopher, andmathematicianBernard
Nieuwentijt.90
To the diﬃcult question about how bodies might be formed out of scat-
tered particles, Nieuwentijt replied with an optical analogy. If the atoms of
light can be subjected to certain natural laws to form a shadow, it should
not be impossible for the same process to take place with the particles of
dead bodies. Chemistry furnished an answer to objections from the de-
structibility of matter. Like Boyle, Nieuwentijt recalled that the properties
of a given substance persist throughmixtures and transformations and that
the original substance can be retrieved thanks to chemical manipulations.
In the makeup of the body, ﬂesh, bones, and membranes are not con-
founded, and each is nourished by appropriate substances. Finally,distance
between a corpse’s particles is not a problem because the magnet attracts
iron, and the universe is governed by the Newtonian law of attraction.
Nieuwentijt’s goal was not so much to reply to traditional objections as
to imagine a positive hypothesis about the possibility of resurrection. After
all, “a bare Hypothesis is suﬃcient to shew the Possibility of Any Thing”
(RP, 3:1049). He thus distinguished between “visible” body (also termed
“peculiar” or “particular” body) and “proper” or “own” body. Although a
person’s visible body changes considerably in a lifetime, we recognize it as
being that same person’s body. This sameness is accounted for by the own
body,which is invariable and belongs to one person alone: “if one says, that
such a man is 80 Years old, it can only be meant of the own Body, since all
the Food that he has used in the last 10, 20, or 30 Years of his Life cannot be
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91. MarcelloMalpighi,Dissertatio epistolica de formatione pulli in ovo [On the Formation of the
Chick in the Egg], vol. 2 of Howard B. Adelmann,MarcelloMalpighi and the Evolution of
Embyrology (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966). On the concept of stamen, see ibid, 2:936–38, n. 3. For Nieuwentijt
on the stamen, see The Religious Philosopher, contemplation 16.
92. This interpretation is reproduced in the vast anthropological encyclopedia of the Spanish
Jesuit LorenzoHerva´s y Panduro, “Diﬁcultades que se oponen a´ la resurreccion de los cuerpos,”
Historia de la vida del hombre, 7 vols. (Madrid, 1799), 7: 375–92.
said to have appertained to his visible Body the whole Space of 80 Years”
(RP, 3:1050–51).
The visible body consists of ﬂuids and solids and is governed by partic-
ular laws. But what is the own body? It cannot be ﬂuids because they vary
considerably and can even leave the body entirely. It cannotbephysiological
laws either, for diﬀerent laws apply to women and men, the ill and the
healthy, the old and the young; moreover, we do not hesitate to speak of an
own body in relation to a corpse, which is no longer governed by the laws
of living bodies. The own body, Nieuwentijt concludes, is therefore to be
sought in “the simple and naked solid Parts thereof” and especially in the
“stamen” of the body (RP, 3:1053).
The “stamen” is the organic germ out of which the body develops. “It
is very well known,” writes Nieuwentijt, “to those that are versed in the
Inquiries of the present Age,” that plants, animals, and humans “consist
of a ﬁrst Principle or Stamen, which may therefore be denominated the
own Body” (RP, 3:1054). Nieuwentijt does not mention authors butmakes
clear his reference to contemporary embryology and, in particular, to the
observations on the formation of the chick in the egg that Marcello Mal-
pighi had reported to the Royal Society in 1672. InMalphighi’s vocabulary,
the latin word stamen (ﬁlament, thread) designated the earliest detectable
traces of the embryo. The ﬁlaments were supposed to be preformedwithin
the egg and to constitute the rudiments of the entire mature organism
(ﬁgs. 2a and 2b).91
During organic growth, Nieuwentijt explains, the stamen either “un-
folds” or is “cloathed,” “ﬁlled,” and “stuﬀed” with matter; whatever the
theory, to the extent that the stamen contains all the solid parts of the body,
it “must be reckon’d the own Body” (RP, 3:1054). The own body is nothing
other than “a Stamen increased to a certain Bigness” (RP, 3:1062); and a
person’s resurrected body need be nothing other than that same person’s
own body.92 In sum, persons will resurrect with their own bodies by virtue
of the stamen. The resulting body will truly be their own, whether or not
the matter surrounding the stamen is numerically the same as that of the
original terrestrial body:
there will be nothing more required, that such a Person should rise
with his own Body, than that only this Stamen, separately from the
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f igure 2a. Figure 2a fromMarcelloMalpighi,Dissertatio epistolica de formatione pulli in ovo
(1672).Malpighi’s drawing of the “cicatricula” of a one-day old, not yet incubated egg, containing
the preformed “ﬁrst ﬁlaments” (stamina) of the chick. In the center there is a “cinereus saccule” or
“follicle” (B) ﬂoating in a “colliquament” (C) that resemblesmolten glass and is surrounded by
circles of solid (D, F, H) and ﬂuid (E, G, I) matter. The fetus (L), wroteMalpighi, is enclosed in the
saccule “as if in an amnion; and its head, with the stamina of the carina [ﬁrst rudiments of the
spinal cord] appended to it, was clearly evident.” From: Howard B. Adelmann,MarcelloMalpighi
and the Evolution of Embyrology (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966).
93. Decisive—thoughprobably not more than Athenagoras’s similar claim that humans cannot
assimilate human ﬂesh, or Augustine’s that all digestedmatter dissipates into the air.
Particles that cloath and ﬁll the Body, should remain . . . and that the
great Author of our Resurrection should, after Death, unfold, ﬁll and
cloath the same into a visible Body, with the same Matter that be-
longed to it before . . . or else with such other Matter as he shall be
pleased to use. [RP, 3:1055]
Boyle had spoken of the “portion of thematter of a dead body” that, united
by God with more matter to form a human body, will be reputed “the same
man.” The stamen turns out to be such portion of matter.
Thus Nieuwentijt was able (like Hody, but with more physiological pre-
cision) to formulate a decisive argument against the objection from an-
thropophagy.93 Since it is unlikely that a person’s stamen can be assimilated
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f igure 2b. Detail of Malpighi’s drawing.
94. The stamen theory, whichmay be called the germ theory of bodily identity, has a
descendant in Saul Kripke’s notion of the necessity of origin, according to which a person’s
identity is ultimately deﬁned by genealogy; the one thing we cannot possibly be is the oﬀspring of
parents other than our own. See Saul Kripke,Naming and Necessity (Oxford, 1980).
into another person’s body, each stamen persists separately; and “it would
likewise happen, according to the commonCourse of Nature, that the solid
Particles divested of all their Juices, or the own Bodies of the devoured Per-
son,wouldbe discharged, or cast outunmingledwith thoseof theDevourer;
and consequently that each of themmight appear separate and entire at the
time of its Resurrection” (RP, 3:1064). If cannibals only feed on “visible”
bodies, then the food chain diﬃculty dissolves entirely.94
Brains and Seminal Particles
Although Nieuwentijt focused on the body, he constantly spoke of the
person and made it clear that having an own body is the condition of pos-
sibility of personhood. He did not, however, confront the speciﬁcally psy-
chological question of identity. For that, it was necessary to integrate
physiology and psychology. Samuel Clarke, Newton’s friend and advocate,
did that in the Boyle lectures of 1704–1705. Immediately after stating that
cannibalism was the “only real diﬃculty,” he discarded it as “a greatTriﬂe.”
For him, as for Boyle, it is not necessary “that, to constitute the same Body,
theremust be an exactRestitutionof all andonly the sameParts.”Onecould
of course imagine God preventing the substance of one human body from
becoming the substance of another. In the light of contemporary embry-
ology, Clarke felt the conjecture was superﬂuous.
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95. See Samuel Clarke,ADiscourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of
Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation, 10th ed. (London, 1768),
p. 206.
96. AsMalpighi, other seventeenth-centurymicrocopists adhered to the preformation theory of
generation that would dominate throughout the eighteenth century. Ovists, such as Jan
Swammerdam, thought organismswere preformed in the egg; animalculists, that they were
preformed as the “animalcules”Antoni van Leeuwenhoek had discerned in the sperm. In both cases,
development consists in the unfolding or expansion of a preexisting form. The preformation theory
was often accompaniedby the idea of emboıˆtement,or encapsulation, according to which all future
generations of an organism exist within that organism’s germ—the egg for the ovists, the sperm for
the animalculists—ultimatelyback to Eve’s egg and Adam’s sperm.
97. Clarke,ADiscourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, p. 207.
98. See Essais sur la Providence et sur la possibilite´ physique de la Re´surrection, 2d ed. (1719;
Amsterdam, 1731); hereafter abbreviated E.After his conversion in 1704, Bion published a
bestseller,Relation des tourments qu’on fait souﬀrir aux Protestants qui sont sur les gale`res de France
(1708); he also translated Burnet’sA Treatise Concerning the State of the Departed Souls; see Burnet,
First, in a clear allusion to Malpighi, Clarke declared, “no Man can say
’tis probable that the original Stamina, which contain all and every one of
the solid Parts and Vessels of the Body, not excepting even the minutest
Nerves and Fibres, are themselves the intire Body.” Strictly speaking, what-
ever comes from the outside to nourish the organism and make it develop
is not itself part of the body. In contrast to this constantly ﬂuctuating “ex-
traneous Matter,” the primal ﬁlaments persist unchanged; therefore, no
“Confusion of Bodies” can ever take place, as was feared in the case of can-
nibalism.95
Clarke also used the preformation theory of generation. He explained
that every organism contains a tiny “seminal Principle” that is itself the
entire future organism.96 Perhaps our terrestrial body is nothing but the
slough of one such hidden principle—“(possibly the present Seat of theSoul)
which at the Resurrection shall discover itself in its proper Form.”97 Once
again, regardless of the appearance resurrected bodies will assume, they will
truly be the bodies of the persons to whom they belong. Boyle had stated
that only a portion of the originalmatter is necessary for a resurrectedbody
to be the same as a terrestrial body. As Nieuwentijt did a few years later,
Clarke identiﬁed this portion with the ﬁlaments that, inMalpighi’s embry-
ology, function as the rudiments of mature organisms. The stamen thus
constitutes the essence of the body’s potential to express self.
The staminal hypothesis was extremely successful and inspired curious
elaborations. In 1719 a collection appeared of Essays on Providence and on
the Physical Possibility of the Resurrection. Published in French, its claim to
have been “translated from the English of Dr. B.” for a while turned Boyle
into the presumed author. The book has been attributed to Jean-Franc¸ois
Bion, a French priest who converted to Protestantism after being chaplain
to Huguenot gale´riens.98 Bion’s purpose was to elucidate Providence and
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99. Spirit is here used in the chemical sense of a volatile substance (such as is produced by
fermentation).
resurrection physiologically. The will, he explained, has no inﬂuence on
bodily processes such as the circulation of the blood but can control others
(for example, breathing) that are just as essential to life and as much gov-
erned by general and immutable laws. The reason why some functions can
be voluntarily directed is that they depend on an excess of ﬂuids,withwhich
we are free to do what we want. It is the same, Bion claimed, with Provi-
dence. God originally put in nature ﬂuids that lack a determinate function,
and these he uses occasionally to alter the course of nature without sus-
pending its laws (see E, p. 18). Thus couldHe stop themovement of the sun
and the moon so that Joshua could defeat his enemies (see Josh. 10:12–13)
or (a physico-theological favorite) make the iron axe ﬂoat on the waters of
the river Jordan.
In the case of the living world, Bion adds preformationism to the laws
of moving matter and postulates that the germs of all beings were created
by God at the beginning of life (see E, p. 16). The existence of these atomes
organise´s in the vegetable world is illustrated by an alchemical classic, the
poppy that grows out of its planted ashes. As for animal germs, their sig-
niﬁcance for resurrection is that they are imperishable. How else could one
explain the rain of tiny frogs the author claims to have seen in Languedoc
and supposedly common in hot countries? Frogs lay their eggs in marshes;
when water from these marshes evaporates, fertilized eggs rise with it; if
they happen to end up in the clouds of a storm, they develop, and the result
is a rain of minute, perfectly formed frogs (see E, pp. 34–36).
For Bion, then, germs are “the unraveling of the question about res-
urrection. For if men come from a germ, and this germ is imperishable
and constitutes each man’s ﬁxed principle, then it will be no longer sur-
prising that it take again a human form” (E, p. 226). Even more: the germ
is “the true self ” (le ve´ritable moi; [E, p. 232]). After death, it will develop
by processes akin to the dehydration and rehydration of frog’s eggs. Now,
generationwas believed to require fermentation.Why?Because fermentation
produces the “universal spirit” that functions as the “active cause” of gen-
eration (E, p. 237).99 This explains why the raining frogs are so small; their
germs receive such a sudden abundance of universal spirit that they attain
perfection “in a minute” and have no time to reach their ordinary size.
Such is Bion’s model for resurrection, one that makes “all the objections
concerning the dogma . . . fall by themselves” (E, p. 242). Fermentation?
Traite´ de l’e´tat des morts et des re´suscitans (Paris, 1731), and Tobias Swinden’sAn Enquiry into the
Nature and Place of Hell (1714), under the title, Recherches sur la nature du fer de l’enfer: Et du lieu
ou` il est situe´ (Amsterdam, 1757), a book that argues in favor of the reality and eternity of
punishment by ﬁre.
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100. Bionmight have been thinking of the Apocalypse, where destruction by ﬁre is the rule, and
especially, perhaps, of Revelation 8:5–12 where, after an angel casts ﬁre onto the earth, others start
sounding trumpets, signaling the burning of trees and grass, the transformationof seas into blood
and of other waters into wormwood, the death of living creatures, and the darkening of the stars.
101. IsaacWatts, “The Resurrection of the Same Body,” Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects,
3rd ed. (1713; London, 1742), pp. 191–92.
102. See Thomas Broughton,A Prospect of Futurity, in Four Dissertations on the Nature and
Circumstances of the Life to Come:With a PreliminaryDiscourse on the Natural and Oral Evidences
of a Future State; and an Appendix on the General Conﬂagration, or Burning of theWorld (London,
1768), pp. 189–90.
Germs? Spirits? All the ingredients are there. Scripture, Bion claims, states
that at the end of time the elements will be dissolved by heat.100
Consequently, there will be a strange fermentation, and hence a great
abundance of universal spirit, which will be able, in an instant, to give
all human germs a sudden and perfect growth. It [the result of this
process] will be truly ourselves, since it will be our same germs,
though with the diﬀerence that we will perhaps have none of the parts
that previously composed our bodies. [E, p. 242]
Not all embryological arguments were as convoluted. In the early 1710s, the
theologian Isaac Watts, a moderate Lockean and celebrated hymn writer,
repeated the germ theory but emphasized that sameness required the “sta-
minal particles” to be united to the same soul. As he wrote,
it seems that these unchanging Parts, whether few or many, in union
with the same Soul, are abundantly suﬃcient to denominateMethuse-
lah the Infant, and Methuselah the aged, the same person; and then also
these few essential constituent Particles . . . united to the same Soul,
are suﬃcient to denominateMethuselah dying andMethuselah rising
the same Person still, both Soul and Body.101
Staminal particlesmake the body self-identical. In 1728, themodelwas taken
up in Chambers’s Cyclopedia. Bymid-century, Chambers’s article was cop-
ied with modiﬁcations in Diderot’s Encylope´die under the title “Re´surrec-
tion,” which also incorporated Locke’s ideas on personal identity and
presented the whole theory as something to be taken for granted.
The popularity of the germinal theory does not mean it went unques-
tioned. Thomas Broughton, an English divine, pointed out that, because
stamina are made up of matter, they are as liable to dissolution and cor-
ruption as any other matter.102 As an alternative, he suggested that a body
formed out of a corpse’s residue, “without the Admixture of any foreign
Matter,” would be “the same Body” and that, out of any quantity ofmatter,
God may form a complete body “for the Reception of the returning Soul.”
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104. Their speculations ﬁt into a larger context of Enlightenment physico-theology; see
FernandoVidal, “ExtraordinaryBodies and the Physico-theological Imagination,” inNature on
Display in Eighteenth-CenturyEurope, ed. Gianna Pomata and LorraineDaston (forthcoming).
This article is available as preprint no. 188 of theMax Planck Institut fu¨r Wissenschaftsgeschichte
(Berlin, 2001).
105. DavidHartley,Observations onMan, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations, 6th ed.
(1749; London, 1834), pp. 559, 560.
106. Ibid., p. 571.
Indeed, Broughton observed, “it is in the Power ofGod, out of a very small
Remainder of the dead Body, to form, by Dilatation, Expansion, or Rare-
faction, a Body of equal Size and Dimension, though not of equal Density,
with That, which was laid in the Grave.”103 Like Burnet almost a century
earlier, Broughton emphasized the ethereal nature of the resurrected body.
But, even at that point of spiritization, somematerial vestige of the original
was deemed necessary.
The Enlightenment Climax: Embryo-neuro-psycho-theology
Compared to purely embryologicalmodels, Clarke’s theorywas highly in-
novative. For him, the bodily remnant out of which the resurrected body
would evolve was an imperishable organic structure that functionednotonly
as a seminal developmental principle but also as the seat of the soul. Such a
structure, therefore, would operate as the basis of bodily and psychological
identity alike, as the material foundation of both the embodied self and the
“enselved” body.Whether or notClarkewas theﬁrst to formulate it, thecom-
bination of embryological germ and seat of the soul was found convincing
by, among others, twomajor ﬁgures in the history of eighteenth-centurypsy-
chology and philosophy, David Hartley and Charles Bonnet.104
The second part of Hartley’s Observations on Man is often overlooked.
The well-known ﬁrst part elaborates an associationist psychology based on
the theory of vibrations and “vibratiuncles” of the nerves. The forgotten
second part is an apologetic treatise of morality and natural religion. And
it is here that Hartley, in an attempt to render the resurrection intelligible,
postulates the existence of an “elementary inﬁnitesimal body in the em-
bryo.” This body has the double function of receiving sensations andbring-
ing about organic development. After death, he explains, it subsists, retains
“its power of vegetating again,” and thus makes possible the development
of a resurrected body.105 Again, body is indispensable for self, since,Hartley
writes, “neither the elementary body, nor the immaterial principle, which
is generally supposed to preside over this, can exert themselves without a
set of suitable organs.”106
103. Ibid, pp. 194–95, 200.
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108. The centrality of resurrection in Bonnet’s thought has not been studied in detail but is
recognized byMax Grober, “The Natural History of Heaven and the Historical Proofs of
Christianity: La Palinge´ne´sie philosophique of Charles Bonnet,” Studies on Voltaire and the
Eighteenth Century 308 (1993): 233–55. See also Roselyne Rey, “La Partie, le tout et l’individu:
Science et philosophie dans l’oeuvre de Charles Bonnet,” and Vidal, “La Psychologie de Charles
Bonnet comme ‘miniature’ de sa me´taphysique,” inCharles Bonnet, savant et philosophe (1720–
1793), ed. Marino Buscaglia et al. (Geneva, 1994), pp. 61–76, 43–50.
109. See Bonnet, Essais sur la vie a` venir (Paris, 1828), p. 8.
110. See Bonnet,Me´moires autobiographiques de Charles Bonnet de Gene`ve, ed. Raymond Savioz
(Paris, 1948), p. 238; hereafter abbreviatedMA.
111. Bonnet,Contemplation de la nature (1764),Oeuvres, 4:1:139, n. 5.
112. See Bonnet, Essai analytique sur les faculte´s de l’aˆme (1760),Oeuvres, vol. 6, § 730.
113. Ibid., §§ 745, 747.
The fullest and most remarkable speculations on the subject are to be
found in the work of the Genevan naturalist and philosopher Charles Bon-
net.107 Author of important investigations in natural history and of a phil-
osophical system that combines Lockian sensationism with Leibnizian
metaphysics, Bonnet gave the problem of resurrection a central place in his
thinking and life (ﬁg. 3).108 His argument can be summarized in the follow-
ingway:Humans are composed of body and soul; they can therefore survive
only asmixed beings.109 Personal identity depends onmemory (Locke’s the-
ory), and memory is based in the brain. It follows that, if man is to keep his
identity in the afterlife, his soul must remain united to some indestructible
organ, perhaps the same that functions as the seat of the soul.110 Bonnet
describes it as a “little ethereal machine” and as an “indestructible brain”
encased in the brains of our terrestrial bodies. In addition to being the seat
of the soul, the little machine is the germ of resurrected bodies.111 It will
therefore act in truly embryological fashion, producing bodies in accor-
dance with the preformationist emboıˆtement theory of generation.
In short, our present brains enclose another brain, destined to develop in
the afterlife and to restore our identity, personality, and body together.112
Since the resurrected body will be spiritual and incorruptible, the “small hu-
man body” hidden in the seat of the soul must be physically diﬀerent from
our bodies of ﬂesh. Indeed, it is “that spiritual body which Revelation con-
trasts to the animal body that is only its envelope.”113 But diﬀerences are
secondary. Although body as such is essentially for identity, it is not through
the numerical sameness of terrestrial and spiritual bodies that human be-
ings will prolong their earthly past. Hence the limits of psycho-theology.
“The psychologist,” Bonnet wrote of himself, “who treats of human per-
manence [after death]must investigate analyticallyhow the future statewill
relate to the past state, and by what physical means man will conserve his
107. I will use Charles Bonnet,Oeuvres d’histoire naturelle et de philosophie (Neuchaˆtel, 1781).
Bonnet’s exposition of his ideas is rather repetitive and can be found elsewhere in his work,
especially in Palinge´ne´sie philosophique (1769; see vol. 7 ofOeuvres) and Recherches philosophiques
sur les preuves du christianisme (1770).
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f igure 3. Engraved frontispiece of Charles Bonnet,Oeuvres d’histoire naturelle et de philosophie
(Neuchaˆtel, 1781), after a 1777 oil painting by Jens Juel. The Genevan naturalist and philosopher
Bonnet (1720–93),meditating (as he explained) on the “future restoration and perfecting of living
beings,” with the Gospels open at 1 Cor. 15:36 and 15:35: “ce que vous semez ne reprend point la vie,
s’il ne meurt auparavant—Omort, ou` est ton aiguillon? oˆ Se´pulcre, ou` est ta victoire?” (“that
which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die—O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is
thy victory?”). The plaque reads, “CHARLES BONNET ne´ a` Gene`ve le 13Mars 1720. FUTURI SPES
VIRTUTEMALIT” (“The hope of the future sustains virtue”). Photography: Centre
d’IconographieGenevoise (Geneva).
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115. Bonnet,Contemplation de la nature, 4:1:138–39n.
116. “Lettres a` Monsieur VincentMalacarne,” Lettres sur divers sujets d’histoire naturelle, in
Bonnet,Oeuvres, 5:2:394.
117. Ibid., p. 397.
personality and all the knowledge [connaissances] he acquired in his terres-
trial state” (MA, p. 324).114
Leonhard Euler, the Baselmathematician, foundBonnet’s “little ethereal
machine” too fragile. If a physical accident can shatter our memory—and
therefore our personality—at a time when the “machine” is encasedwithin
our brains of ﬂesh, how will this ethereal organ subsist undamaged after
death,when itwill be no longer protected?Were it destroyed, thepersonality
itself would suﬀer the same fate; and the soul would have to be preserved
by an implausible continuousmiracle (seeMA, pp. 292–93). Bonnet replied
that he did not base the immortality of the soul on the “small organic ma-
chine.” Rather, since the soul is not the “wholeman,” its union toanorganic
structure is indispensable. The Gospels, he observed, do not speak of the
immortality of soul, but of man. If they did, resurrection would be mean-
ingless. “Que signiﬁerait la Re´surrection, si l’aˆme e´tait tout l’homme?” (MA,
p. 301). That is why, for Bonnet, Saint Paul was l’apoˆtre philosophe (MA,
p. 246). The “key to the philosophical explanation” of such Christian dog-
mas as the incarnation and resurrection was the fact that they concern the
“mixed nature of our being” (MA, p. 360). And the key to ourmixed nature
is furnished by the brain. Anatomical debates on the seat of the soul in the
brain are therefore relevant for discussing resurrection.
Bonnet, who was perfectly aware of those debates, was not interested in
determining an exact location.He left the job to physiologists but remarked
that, whatever their opinions, the “immediate” instrument of the opera-
tions of the soul must be a single, unitary organ.115 The signiﬁcance of this
anatomical requirement explains Bonnet’s reaction to the Italian anato-
mist’s Vincenzo Malacarne’s observation that nerves entering the brain do
not converge onto a single location. Bonnet, whose psychological writings
inspired the anatomist, initially accepts he might be wrong.116 Later, how-
ever, he admits his reluctance to give up all convergence and emphasizes
that the soul cannot be present simultaneously throughout the nervous sys-
tem. “Excuse me,” he tells Malacarne, “if I insist on this point: you see well
enough that the Palinge´ne´sie you love is based a little on that seat of the soul
that your anatomical research verymuchundermines.”117 In short, forBon-
net, the possibility of the resurrection as full restitution of bodily and per-
114. Analytically, that is, from observation and experience, as opposed to “synthetically,” by
deduction from principles and axioms.
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118. The fact thatWatts, Hartley, and Bonnet were praised by the English chemist and religious
controversialist Joseph Priestley for their germ theory of resurrectionhighlights how broad the
margins formaneuvering in the physico-theologicalﬁeld were. Priestley asserted themateriality of
the soul, denied its immortality, and (in analogies that explicitly concerned personal identity)
aﬃrmed that we are as entirely composed ofmatter as a river of water or a forest of trees. For all
intents and purposes, he said, we shall at resurrectionbe the samewe were on earth if “we shall all
know one another again, and converse together as before” (Joseph Priestley,Disquisitions Relating to
Matter and Spirit and the Doctrine of PhilosophicalNecessity Illustrated [1777; NewYork, 1976],
p. 160).
119. Voltaire,Dieu et les hommes, oeuvre the´ologiquemais raisonnable (1769), ed. Roland
Mortier, in vol. 69 of Les Oeuvres comple`tes de Voltaire (Oxford, 1994), p. 454.
120. For Immanuel Kant, a foundational ﬁgure of liberal Protestantism, the immortality of the
soul is a postulate of pure practical reason, and the resurrection of Jesus, a legend in which Saint
Paul would not have believed had it not served as a morally necessary proof of a future life. From
the moral point of view (to which Kant reduces religion), it is irrelevant whether the terrestrial
body is necessary for personal identity in the afterlife or even whether our bodies will be
resurrected. See Immanuel Kant, The Conﬂict of the Faculties (1798), trans.Mary J. Gregor
(Lincoln, Nebr., 1992), where Kant formulates principles of scriptural exegesis aimed at solving the
conﬂict between the faculties of philosophy and theology.
121. In the eighteenth century, allusions to bodily resurrection disappear fromwills, the
funerary ritual in which the presence of the dead body symbolically recalls its organic link to the
soul is given up, and the resurrection of the body is no longer a vehicle for the speculative or
poetical expression of desires of immortality and eternity. SeeMichel Vovelle, Pie´te´ baroque et
de´christianisation en Provence au XVIIIe sie`cle: Les Attitudes devant la mort d’apre`s les clauses des
sonal identity depends on a cerebro-germinal particle whose existence is
incompatible with the dispersion of soul in diﬀerent brain locations.118
What Is Left?
We have witnessed a gradual disembodiment. When Bonnet made the
embryology of the resurrected body and the developmental neuropsychol-
ogy of personal identity coincide, he imagined that the “germ” of the res-
urrected body was a brain. Voltaire was sarcastic, but not inaccurate, when
he wrote that the Genevan “seems persuaded that our bodies will resurrect
without a stomach, and without the front and rear parts, but with intellec-
tual ﬁbers and excellent intellects.”119 Boyle concluded that only a portion
of the terrestrial body’s matter was necessary to form resurrected bodies;
Leibniz spoke of amysterious substantiae ﬂos;Locke reducedpersonal iden-
tity to psychological continuity; Clarke speculated that the seminal ﬁbers
of the glorious body were also the seat of the soul; and by giving this pri-
mordial structure the shape of a brain, Bonnet accomplished the tendency
to minimize the place of ﬂesh and to replace the resurrection of the body
by a resurrection of brain-located psychological identities. This disincar-
nating trend will have to be connected to the emergence of liberal Protes-
tantism120 as well as to the changes in attitudes toward life and death that
marginalized traditional doctrines andbeliefs about the resurrection.121The
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122. “We do not turn away fromwonder once we have given it credence, and for a long time we
strain to rationalize wonders rather than to reduce them” (Gaston Bachelard, La Formation de
l’esprit scientiﬁque: Contribution a` une psychanalyse de la connaissance objective, 11th ed. [1938;
Paris, 1980], p. 108).
123. See Daston and Katharine Park,Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750 (New York,
1998), chap. 9.
124. See Louis-VincentThomas, “L’Eschatologie: Permanence et mutation,” in Thomas et al.,
Re´incarnation, immortalite´, re´surrection (Bruxelles, 1988), pp. 1–42.
body was henceforth relevant only as a physical basis of the psychological
features deemed necessary for personal identity.
“On ne se de´tache pas du merveilleux, quand une fois on lui a donne´ sa
cre´ance, et pendant longtempson s’acharne a` rationaliser lamerveilleplutoˆt
qu’a` la re´duire.”122 Gaston Bachelard’s astute observation on the diﬃculty
of dissolving wonder may sum up the history of attempts at naturalizing
the resurrection. Yet the raising of the dead is a special case. It may be, if it
ever happens, the wonder of wonders, but it also stands apart from the nat-
ural and preternatural marvels the Enlightenment sought to discredit and
domesticate.123 The criteria of testimony used to judge miracles or extraor-
dinary phenomena can apply only indirectly to an event supposed to be
outside time and space and one supposed to signal the end of nature and
the universe. Although the intrinsic plausibility of resurrection could be
questioned, belief in its probability or certainty did not count as the su-
perstitious or “enthusiastic” product of a diseased imagination. The En-
lightenment contributed to make the miraculous less prominent in
theology and faith and to leave it behind as a silent and unsettled question
on the edges of culture, ignored, like marvels, rather than debunked. In the
process, the body was lost.
What became implausible was not resurrection as such but the resur-
rection of the (same) body. Such a judgment stimulated the proposition of
alternatives that deeply altered the landscape of belief. By the end of the
eighteenth century, the psychological problem of personal identity had tri-
umphed over the numerical sameness of bodies. Disembodiment thus sus-
tained the doctrines of metempsychosis that, since the nineteenth century,
have dominated over traditional Christian eschatology.124 Yet, on the mar-
gins of this transformation, and independently of other discussions on the
persistence of personality after death, debates took place during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries on the relations between the resurrection of
the ﬂesh and scientiﬁc models and data. A version of the germ theory was
testaments (Paris, 1973); Pierre Chaunu, LaMort a` Paris: XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe sie`cles (Paris, 1978);
and Robert Favre, LaMort dans la litte´rature et la pense´e franc¸aises au sie`cle des Lumie`res (Lyon,
1978), chap. 12.
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126. See Detlef Bernhard Linke, “Gehirn, Seele, und Auferstehung,” Evangelische Theologie 50
(1990): 128–35, esp. pp. 133–35.
127. See Frank J. Tipler,The Physics of Immortality:Modern Cosmology, God, and the
Resurrection of the Dead (New York, 1994), chap. 9.
128. For curious reﬂections on the dissolution of the biological body and its incorporation into
the information body, see Knowbotic Research, “Postorganic Immortality: VomKo¨rper zu
‘Incorporations,’”Kunstforum 133 (Feb.-Apr. 1996): 161–65.
proposed in 1888; a century later, it was imaginable that DNA and rawma-
terials could suﬃce to bring about the resurrection of the body.125
Successive amputations of the body have been accompanied by an in-
creasing precision concerning the part of ﬂesh necessary for personal iden-
tity. Initially, there was an indeterminate portion of matter, which early on
adopted the form of a seminal particle. Because embryology alone was in-
capable of accounting for identity, the seminal particle assumed some fea-
tures of the brain. Endowedwith a double function, the “germ”was entirely
responsible for the postmortemdevelopment of resurrectedpersons aspsy-
chosomatic unities. But why bother with the body? All we need for Judg-
ment Day is an accountable and conscious personality. To the extent that
the brain is responsible for it, why not limit resurrection to the brain? And
why not go a step further? If only part of the brain is necessary to be aperson,
shall we need it whole to enjoy the beatiﬁc vision?126 Maybe just a fraction
will suﬃce. This fraction will have to contain the information necessary for
deﬁning the self. A computer programmight therefore be enough. The res-
urrected I need be nothing other than the computer equivalent ofmybrain.
In this way, thanks to the progress of technology, to resurrect might even-
tually mean to be emulated by supercomputers; thus resurrected, we shall
inhabit a hereafter whose technical name is cyberspace.127 But how much
can “we” disembody ourselves without becoming simulacra? Are we still
“us” in a state of “postorganic” immortality?128
I see in the story sketched here at least two lessons to be drawn. One is
methodological. When looked at fromwithin philosophy, the history of the
self tends to study the history ofnotions of the self; and it is furthersupposed
that such notions, when not explicitly formulated, can be inferred from
philosophical texts. Self thus appears to be a transhistorical object whose
manifestations and metamorphoses the philosopher-historian can appre-
hend. It is in this vein that PaulRicoeur remarks that thequestionof identity
has always generated interest in puzzle cases and that humans have always
been intrigued by religious beliefs about transmigration, immortality, and
125. SeeMarc Thury, “Le Dogme de la re´surrection et les sciences de la nature,”Revue
chre´tienne 4 (1888): 573–81, andMarcel Bessis, “Une Version athe´e de la re´surrection des corps,” in
Soi et non-soi: Des biologistes, me´decins, philosophes, et the´ologiens s’interrogent, ed. Jean Bernard,
Marcel Bessis, and Claude Debru (Paris, 1990), pp. 261–65.
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130. For recent examples, see Representations of the Self from the Renaissance to Romanticism, ed.
Patrick Coleman, Jayne Lewis, and Jill Kowalik (Cambridge, 2000); see alsoMichaelMascuch,
Origins of the Individualist Self: Autobiography and Self-Identity in England, 1591–1791 (Cambridge,
1997).
131. For recent examples, see “Identity, Self, and Subject,” a special issue ofHistory of the
Human Sciences 7 (May 1994); see alsoRewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the
Present, ed. Porter (London, 1997).
132. Nikolas S. Rose, “How Should One Do the History of the Self?” Inventing Our Selves:
Psychology, Power, and Personhood (New York, 1996), p. 25.
resurrection.129 By implying that such beliefs exist as puzzle cases about a
preexisting underlying question, Ricoeur turns around what I take to be
their signiﬁcance. Discussions about transmigration, immortality, or res-
urrection were not epiphenomenal expressions of a latent interest in the
question of identity; theywere, Iwould argue, consubstantial to that interest
itself.
Even when looked at from within history (and to the extent that it is
possible to give a single name to a prodigiously diversiﬁed ﬁeld), the on-
tological basis of self sometimes seems to transcend historical contingency.
This is not because it is thought to be stable across time but because it is
seen as represented, expressed, or legitimized—rather thanactuallymade—
through diverse “life-writing” and self-dramatization pratices, such as con-
fessions, memoirs, autobiographies, as well as novels and biographies.130
There is, of course, a large ﬁeld of studies about the formation of embodied
selves (individual, gendered, racial, and so on).131 In its most Foucauldian
version, the history of the self deals with a “genealogy of subjectiﬁcation”
that, in Nikolas Rose’s words,
focuses directly on the practices that locate human beings in particular
“regimes of the person.” It does not write a continuous history of the
self, but rather accounts for the diversity of languages of “personhood”
that have taken shape—character, personality, identity, reputation,
honor, citizen, individual, normal, lunatic, patient, client, husband,
mother, daughter—and the norms, techniques, and relations of au-
thority within which these have circulated in legal, domestic, indus-
trial, and other practices for acting upon the conduct of persons.
The object of genealogy is neither changing ideas of the person, nor the
person as psychological entity, but the largely “technical” disciplines of
mind and body whereby “human beings come to relate to themselves and
others as subjects of a certain type.”132 These techniques are not applied to
129. “La question de l’identite´ a toujours suscite´ l’inte´reˆt pour des cas paradoxaux. Les
croyances religieuses et the´ologiques relatives a` la transmigration des aˆmes, a` l’immortalite´, a` la
re´surrection de la chair, n’ont pas manque´ d’intriguer les esprits” (Ricoeur, Soi-meˆme comme
un autre, pp. 160–61).
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134. This remark is inspired by Je´roˆme Baschet’s emphasis on the “spiritual body” as a duality
characterized by the domination of the soul over the body and by the body’s elevation through
submission to the soul. As a model for the authority of the clergy over secular society, such a
hierarchical and dynamic union appears as a fundamental ideological and social matrix in
Medieval Latin Christendom. See Je´roˆme Baschet, “Ame et corps dans l’occidentme´die´val: Une
Dualite´ dynamique, entre pluralite´ et dualisme,”Archives de sciences sociales des religions 112
(2000): 5–30, esp. pp. 19–26.
135. See Daston and Peter Galison, “The Image of Objectivity,”Representations,no. 40 (Fall
1992): 81–128, and Daston, “L’Invention de l’objectivite´,”Cahiers de Science and Vie, no. 48 (Dec.
the self but constitutive of it. This does not mean that human beings do not
exist independently of those techniques but that, as highlighted by Ian
Hacking’s “dynamic nominalism,” part of what we eﬀectively are and do is
connected with our descriptions.133
The constructionist Foucauldian orientation poses a challenge opposite
to that of the philosophical. Philosophers’ narratives focus on the concept
of self or on discourses fromwhich the concept can supposedly be inferred.
Historians, in contrast, tend to overlook the concept, as if its history qua
concept played no role in instituting the regimes of the self. Although I do
not assume an underlying perennial self, what I have done here is obviously
closer to the history of ideas than to genealogy. Nevertheless, I want to sug-
gest that concepts have their own eﬃcacy and should be incorporated into
genealogy as active agents. In the same way that, say, child-rearing tech-
niques are not about the self nor applied to it as a preexisting object, debates
about the resurrection of the body were not about identity, nor were the
issues discussed in connection with them contemplated as puzzle cases in
the philosophy of mind. Rather, they were among the materials withwhich
notions of identity were elaborated and through which, historically, such
notions came into existence. This became apparent in the wake of Locke’s
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, when the resurrection of the body
was explicitly linked to personal identity. The “modern” regimes of self, and
the corresponding ways of experiencing oneself, were thus connected to the
development of new concepts of the self. The redeﬁnition of the resurrected
identity belonged in the construction of new models of being based less on
the hierarchical subordination of the body to the soul than on a generative
subordination of selfhood to the brain and to an objectiﬁed self-conscious-
ness. The glorious body was no longer necessary as ideal for the discipline of
terrestrial bodies.134 The story sketched here thus suggests the need for
bringing the history of ideas and the genealogy of subjectiﬁcation together
into an approach thatwill ultimately do for personal identitywhathistorical
epistemology is doing for the history of objectivity.135
133. See Ian Hacking, “Making up People,” in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy,
Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E.
Wellbery (Stanford, Calif., 1986), pp. 222–36.
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resurrection. As Bunyanwarned, “he that denyeth the Resurrection of the dead, he setteth open a
Floud-gate to all manner of impiety, he cutteth the throat of a truly holy life, and layeth the Reins
upon the neck of the most outragious lusts” (Bunyan,The Resurrection of the Dead, p. 214).
137. Optatif de´sespe´re´: “optative” is that which expresses wish, desire, hope. See Vladimir
Janke´le´vitch, LaMort (Paris, 1977), p. 381.
138. For an illuminating discussion and critique, see Kathleen V.Wilkes, Real People: Personal
Identity without Thought Experiments (Oxford, 1988), esp. chap. 1.
A second lesson might be called inspirational. The idea of resurrection
participated in the political functions of hell.136 Whether it is best consid-
ered, with Freud, as a symptomof a universal neurosis or,with Janke´le´vitch,
as a form of the “hopeless optative,” it has played, for those who believe in
it, an important existential role.137 But political and psychological functions
do not exhaust its historical meaning. Two millennia after its initial for-
mulation, the Christian doctrine of the resurrection has a potential to
question and to move that is more powerful and profound than consid-
erations of wandering little ﬁngers or hypothetical brain transplants.Res-
urrection discourses diﬀer fundamentally from philosophical thought
experiments.138 Indeed, they were not seen as concerning fantastical sit-
uations from which apparently relevant conclusions could be extractedbut
as meaningful matters of momentous real consequences. One of themwas
the certainty that bodies are essential to humanity and that a disembodied
self does not rank as a human being. Thus, while the neuropsychological
eschatologies science and philosophy produced since the seventeenth cen-
tury moved us away from the Middle Ages, our era’s questions and dilem-
mas about self and body take us back. In its ownway, theChristian romance
of the resurrection, with its assertion of the ontologically crucial place of
body for identity and of community for human existence, may still be an
inspiring story for those who, against the neurological reduction of self,
would rather live with body, desire, history, and the other than inhabit the
solitude of isolated brains.
136. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, at a time when the idea of eternal punishment
loses ground in dogmatic theology, divines insist on keeping it as a tool for the maintenance of
moral and social order. See Daniel PickeringWalker,The Decline of Hell: Seventeenth-Century
Discussions of Eternal Torment (Chicago, 1964). Something analogous took place for the
1998): 16–23. For somewhatmore programmatic statements about historical epistemology, see
Daston, “Une Histoire de l’objectivite´,”Des Sciences et des techniques: Un De´bat, ed. Roger
Guesnerie and Franc¸ois Hartog (Paris, 1998), pp. 115–26. And for a study that points in the
direction I’m thinking about, see Jan Goldstein, “Mutations of the Self in Old Regime and
Postrevolutionary France,” in Biographies of Scientiﬁc Objects, ed. Daston (Chicago, 2000). See also
Arnold I. Davidson,The Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation of
Concepts (Cambridge,Mass., 2001).
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